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This thesis examines the divisions over foreign policy that emerged within the 
Labour movement from 1933, and culminated in a debate between its leaders at the 
1935 party conference. In a steadily worsening international environment, pacifists 
and the Left had tentatively begun to develop influential critiques of the party line, 
which through the efforts of Henderson, Dalton, Attlee, Bevin and Citrine was 
becoming increasingly committed to a sanctionist League of Nations. However, it was 
only in the summer of 1935, with Mussolini's impending invasion of Abyssinia, that 
the pacifists, led by Lansbury and Ponsonby, the leaders of the Labour party in the 
two Houses of Parliament, and the leftist Socialist League, led by Cripps, openly 
began to voice their dissent from the party line. 
In discussing the various dimensions of this debate, this thesis draws on a 
wider range of source material than previous accounts of Labour's foreign policy in 
these years. In addition to the frequently consulted published material, it makes 
extensive use of private records - those of the Labour party itself, the TUC and also of 
key individuals. 
This thesis offers a substantial revision of the established literature, which has 
tended to overlook the significance of the Labour party's debates over the imposition 
of sanctions in 1935. It argues that the way in which these intra-party conflicts were 
resolved at the 1935 party conference placed the movement firmly behind armed 
collective security. In doing so it re-established Labour's political credibility and 
facilitated its inclusion in Churchill's wartime government. 
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The decision of Mussolini to invade Abyssinia in 1935 provoked deep 
divisions on foreign policy within the Labour movement and a dramatic crisis in the 
Labour party's political leadership. The way in which this crisis was resolved had 
huge implications for the policy and fortimes of the Labour movement for the rest of 
the 1930s, and into the 1940s. In the event, the majority of the movement followed the 
lead given by Hugh Dalton, Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin and Walter Citrine, and 
accepted that the member states of the League of Nations should be prepared to use 
military as well as economic and financial sanctions against Italy. Nevertheless, the 
arguments advanced by pacifists and those on the Left who opposed this line could not 
be easily dismissed. Above all this was because they echoed themes of peace and anti-
capitalism with which many in the movement sympathised. It was also because the 
movement's official leaders and foremost pariiamentary figures led these dissenting 
minorities. The party's most prominent pacifist - the septuagenarian George Lansbury 
- was also its leader. His fellow pacifist, Arthur Ponsonby, led the Labour party in the 
House of Lords. The leftist critique came from the Socialist League, led by Sir 
Stafford Cripps - another prominent figure in the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), 
and widely regarded as a future leader of the party. 
These factions had been formulating their opposing positions since 1933, 
under the pressure of a deteriorating international environment, especially the rise of 
Nazism in Germany. Intra-party conflict, however, became intense only in the late 
summer of 1935. It then centred on the contentious question of interpretation of 
Article X V I of the League Covenant. This described the range of different sanctions 
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that the League might use against an aggressor nation, but did not define the 
circumstances in which each might be invoked. Moreover, with the League's great 
commitment to disarmament many people (not just in the Labour party) had thought 
that military sanctions were redundant, and had emphasised instead 'moral' or 
economic sanctions. Article X V I detailed how member states would be bound to 
prohibit 'all intercourse between their nationals and the nations of the Covenant-
breaking state' as well as to sever 'all trade and financial relations'. Now, however, 
Dalton, Bevin, Citrine and Attlee were arguing forthrightly that in the last resort 
Article X V I involved the use of military sanctions. For it had also stated that in case 
of aggression, it was 'the duty of the Council...to recommend...what effective 
military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the 
armed forces to be used to protect the covenant of the League'.' The dispute 
culminated in a debate at the 1935 party conference - literally on the eve of the Italian 
attack on Abyssinia - which was one of the most heated and dramatic so far 
experienced. 
The Labour party is particularly prone to divisions over foreign policy. Since 
the Independent Labour Party (ILP) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) joined 
together to form the Labour Representative Committee (LRC) in 1900, it has been a 
loose coalition of different interests, opinions and institutions held together by a 
shared commitment to secure domestic social and economic improvement. For the 
most part differences over foreign policy have been tolerated for the sake of progress 
towards these domestic ends. It has only been at times of great international crises, 
when foreign policy has become central to political debate, that the opposing foreign-
The text of Article XVI of the League Covenant can be found in LPACR, 1935, p. 322. 
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policy traditions within the party, deeply held but often submerged, have come to the 
fore. The Abyssinian conflict precipitated major disagreements between them in much 
the same way as the outbreak of the Great War had done, and as the growing Cold 
War crisis would do during the 1950s. 
The parallels between 1935 and 1914 are especially striking. On both 
occasions the party leader - MacDonald in 1914 and Lansbury in 1935 - foimd 
themselves seriously at odds with the dominant line supported by the NEC and the 
trade unions. In 1914 the majority of the party had followed Arthur Henderson's lead 
and readily backed the British war effort, later joining the wartime coalition 
governments of Asquith and Lloyd George. In contrast, MacDonald, inspired by his 
liberal-radical international beliefs, had resigned the party chairmanship in August 
1914 because he was unwilling to support the declaration of war and vote for the 
government's war credits.^ He was joined in dissent from the party line by many of 
the socialists in the Independent Labour Party (ILP) as well as by pacifists, such as 
Lansbury, who subsequently devoted their energies to organising a range of pacifist 
societies, most notably the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the No 
Conscription Fellowship (NCF).^ Similarly, divisions within the party emerged in 
1951 when, with the onset of the Korean War, the Labour government decided to 
follow a course urged by Attlee and Hugh Gaitskell and introduce a programme of 
rearmament. This prompted the Left's foremost spokesmen, Aneurin Bevan and 
Harold Wilson, to resign from the Cabinet. The debate continued into the following 
year, with the Bevanite line supported in the Commons not only by left-wingers such 
as Michael Foot, but also by pacifists. 
^ D.Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (1977), ch. 9. 
The debate over foreign policy in 1935 came at a particularly crucial juncture 
for the Labour party. In 1931 the second Labour government had sensationally fallen 
apart, unable to agree how to manage a financial crisis. Afterwards it was considered 
vital that the party should work together to develop a range of coherent policies i f the 
electoral credibility lost when MacDonald had defected to form a National 
government was to be regained. In the years after 1933, however, with an 
improvement in the general economic climate and the rise of Hitler, foreign policy had 
steadily emerged as the central political issue, and created disagreement within the 
movement. With a general election due before November 1936 but widely expected 
well before then, there was a pressing need for the party to reconcile its differences 
about the conduct of foreign affairs. 
It is clear that by May 1940 the Labour party had re-established its political 
respectability through its new stance on foreign policy. The party was now strongly 
represented in Churchill's wartime coalition, which had replaced Chamberlain's 
discredited administration. However, the importance of the outcome of Labour's 
debates in 1935 in facilitating this shift is a matter of contention. The earliest accoimts 
- both 'Cato's' fierce polemic Guilty Men and G.D.H.Cole's A History of the Labour 
Party since 1914 - considered these events to have been very significant. Although it 
was a distinctly political work, the perspectives of 'Cato' in 1940 helped shape much 
historical opinion for the next 20 years. So far as the Labour party was concerned, it 
claimed that the debate over the imposition of sanctions against Mussolini marked the 
decisive turning point in its political rejuvenation. Its co-authors, Michael Foot, Peter 
Howard and Frank Owen were keen to absolve the Labour party of any blame for the 
' M.Ceadel, Pacifism in Great Britain 1914-45: The Defining of a Faith (Oxford, 1980), pp.32-7. 
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failure to re-arm Britain in a faster and more effective way. Their central points were 
that this failure had led directly to the retreat from Dunkirk, and that MacDonald, 
Baldwin and particularly Chamberlain were responsible. It contended that between 
1933 and 1935 Labour had undergone 'a genuine party revolution' that took it from a 
position where it favoured a general strike in the event of Britain going to war to one 
where it was committed to confronting Hitler 'with his own weapons'. It argued that 
after the 1935 party conference, due mainly to the efforts of Bevin, the party was 
prepared 'to challenge an Aggressor State even i f it meant War' and, inaccurately, that 
thereafter it 'was officially pledged to armaments every whit as much as the 
government'.'* 
G.D.H. Cole's A History of the Labour Party From 1914 argued that the 'whole 
problem of Labour's international policy came to a head at the Brighton conference' 
in 1935. He qualified the importance of the outcome by stating that the 'ambiguity of 
Labour foreign policy' arising from the forces of pacifism and of leftist dissent within 
the party ranks 'persisted to some extent right up to the Munich crisis'. Nevertheless 
he held that 1935 was a critical juncture in this evolutionary process, because 
continuously thereafter 'those who saw the sheer necessity of getting the arms with 
which to fight the fascists i f necessity arose were gaining ground'.^ 
However, subsequent accounts tended to play down the significance of the 
resolution of Labour party's internal disputes in 1935, in ways that have since shaped 
interpretation of the period. C.L.Mowat's Britain Between the Wars argued that so far 
as its foreign policy was concerned, the Labour party did not 'come to a clear-cut 
decision' in 1935. He correctly noted that until 1937 the PLP rather confiisingly 
4 I Cato', Guilty Men (1940), pp. 29-32. 
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continued to oppose the National government's rearmament measures. But he argued 
more contentiously that it was not until March 1939, when a National Council of 
Labour (NCL) circular stated that rearmament was 'necessary... in the interests of self-
defence alone', that the party explicitly endorsed armed security - a course they had 
only tentatively supported after Munich.^ 
A.J.P.Taylor's The Trouble Makers similarly contended that when 'the 
excitement over Abyssinia died away, it became clear that Labour had failed to make 
the big jump'. His reasons for holding such a view were, however, different from 
those of Mowat. He asserted that thereafter the party's policy had 'two contradictory 
aspects' - a belief that Hitler had to be confronted through an armed alliance, but a 
refusal to countenance this course so long as the National government remained in 
power. He contended that the difference between moderates, such as Attlee, and the 
leftists, such as Cripps, was 'only in emphasis', and that resolutions submitted to the 
party conference in 1936 and 1937 failed to clarify Labour's position. He 
acknowledged that after July 1937 the PLP did not vote against the Service Estimates, 
but pointedly added that it voted against conscription in April 1939. The Labour party, 
according to Taylor's interpretation, did not resolve its internal contradictions and 
come to stand firmly behind armed security until May 1940. One conceptual 
development in his work is of considerable value to any study of Labour's foreign 
policy in the 1930s whatever view is taken of his wider assertions; his neat 
differentiation, later developed by Martin Ceadel, between pacifism and pacificism. 
Pacifism is the belief, held by a section of the Labour party, that war is always wrong. 
' G.D.H.Cole, A History of the Labour Party from 1914 (1948), pp. 305-8, 321. 
* C.L.Mowat, Britain Between the Wars (1955), pp. 550-3, 632. 
and pacificism is the Labour party's official position, which holds the preservation of 
peace as an overriding priority, but accepts that war might sometimes be necessary.^  
The second volume of Dalton's memoirs. The Fateful Years - based on the 
diaries he kept for most of his political career - records his contemporary belief that 
the crucial foreign-policy juncture came in July 1937. This was after the success of his 
own momentous efforts to convince the PLP to switch from voting against to 
abstaining on the National government's Arms Estimates, so in effect giving tacit 
approval to British rearmament.^ 
Alan Bullock's Life and Times of Ernest Bevin rightly portrays Labour's 
debate over sanctions in 1935 as part of the wider battle between the party's Utopian 
left wing, permeated with strands of pacifism and anti-capitalism, and its 'realistic' 
right wing. In this context, however, he does not regard 1935 as any kind of turning 
point. Indeed, he sfresses that 'Spain, appeasement, rearmament, conscription, each 
revived the debate in different forms'.^ 
In his A Short History of the Labour Party Henry Pelling, the leading Labour 
historian after Cole, added an important institutional dimension. He argued that the 
critical transition for the Labour party occurred in the years immediately following the 
1931 crisis, when the TUC General Council, under the control of Bevin and Citrine, 
'moved in to take the helm' of the movement. Thereafter they worked through the 
National Joint Council (NJC), which had been reconstituted with an in-built trade 
union majority, and began to impress their views on the party. In the dire international 
^ A.J.P.Taylor, The Trouble Makers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939 (1957), pp. 189-93. 
Ceadel, Pacifism, esp. ch. 1. Taylor repeated his argument that so far as Labour's foreign policy was 
concerned, after October 1935 'nothing was changed', in A. J.P.Taylor, English History 1914-45 
(Oxford, 1965), p. 382. 
^ H,Dalton, The Fateful Years: Memoirs 1931-45 (1957), pp. 51, 133-4. 
situation of the 1930s they soon came to press for armed collective security, which 
appealed to their 'practical view of foreign affairs based upon their industrial 
experience'. In Felling's interpretation the endorsement of a sanctionist League policy 
in October 1935, and indeed the decision to cease opposition to British rearmament in 
July 1937, was primarily significant because they marked the General Council's 
growing assertion of control over the party.'° 
J.F.Naylor's Labour's International Policy is the only full-scale coverage of 
Labour's foreign policy in the 1930s. It offers more descriptive detail of the growing 
debate over foreign policy between 1933 and 1935 than can be found in other 
accounts, but does not consider them pivotal to the formation of Labour's later stance. 
Naylor concludes that 1935 was 'a watershed' but only in the limited sense that it saw 
'the exorcising of purely pacifist doctrines from official Labour leadership as well as 
from policy for the balance of the decade'. Instead, he sees the 'decisive turning-
point' occurring at the 1937 Labour party conference with the acceptance of a policy 
document. International Policy and Defence, formalising the support for British 
rearmament, and with the conclusive defeat of Cripps's demands for a United Front." 
Maurice Cowling's The Impact of Hitler tentatively offered a revision of the 
orthodoxy, which by stressing subsequent events had implicitly reduced the 
importance of Labour's 1935 debates over the imposition of sanctions against Italy. 
Having stated how foreign policy enabled the party to gain 'respectability', Cowling 
argued that in 1935 Labour underwent 'an upheaval' which 'put the party on one 
' A.Bullock, Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Volume L Trade Union Leader 1881-40 (1960), ch. 20, 
esp. pp. 547-9. 
E..mimg, A Short History of the Labour Party (\96\), ch. 5. 
J.F.Naylor, Labour's International Policy: The Labour Party in the 1930s (1969), chs. 3,4, esp. pp. 
109-11, ch. 6, esp. 202-7. 
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rather than the other of the foreign-policy forks over which it had been hovering in the 
previous year'. However, this was very much a subsidiary point in a book whose main 
argument is that the debates over foreign policy in these years can only be understood 
in relation to the political objectives of politicians - a point he perceptively applied to 
intra-party struggles as well as to the broader canvass of inter-party conflict.'^ 
Since Cowling's contribution, however, the significance of the Labour party's 
debates over Abyssinia has not been seriously discussed and reassessed. A clearer 
understanding of the importance of these intra-party debates on foreign policy would 
have assisted one of the most notable studies of the Labour party in the 1930s - Ben 
Pimlott's Labour and the Left. This book is implicitly dismissive of Labour's eventual 
attainment of respectability in the late 1930s, and contends that the party actually 
missed a great opportunity to attain power in these years. He asserts that in early 1938 
the Labour leadership was so preoccupied with checking its own left wing that it 
failed to grasp the chance to lead a broad opposition, involving the dissident 
Conservatives - Churchill, Amery and Eden as well as Liberals, such as Sinclair -
against the inadequacies of Chamberlain's foreign policy. He argues that the loose 
alliance, which Labour belatedly and tentatively began to forge with these factions 
after Munich in autumn 1938, could have been made into an actual coalition 
government earlier in 1938 i f the Labour party had been more receptive to the idea of 
a Popular Front. However, at this stage, argues Pimlott, the party leadership was 
opposed to the idea because its most enthusiastic supporter within the party was the 
troublesome leftist Cripps. In the previous year Cripps had vigorously supported the 
creation of a United Front - an anti-fascist alliance comprising just Labour, the ILP 
'^M.Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and Policy 1933-40 (C2tmhni%e, 1975), esp. pp. 
and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) - which the party leadership had 
opposed, perceiving it as an opportunity for the Communists to infiltrate the Labour 
party. When, therefore, he began to advocate a wider alliance, the new line was 
regarded by many as simply another Communist ploy. Yet despite Pimlott's emphasis 
on the Labour party's opportunities in the late 1930s, his otherwise comprehensive 
study does not examine the process by which it had come to hold views on foreign 
policy so similar to those of the Conservative and Liberal anti-appeasers that an 
alliance was even a possibility. 
There have been a number of biographies written in the last 20 years on the 
leading figures in the Labour party's 1935 debates. Naturally enough they all consider 
the impact of the events on their subjects, but following the established literature they 
fail to investigate the wider implications of the decision reached at the party 
conference.''* By far the most noteworthy of these recent biographies is Pimlott's 
study of Hugh Dalton. Here Pimlott does elaborate on the process by which Labour 
established a credible position on foreign policy. Above all, however, he is keen to 
portray Dalton as the architect of Labour's transition from being 'essentially a pacifist 
party' in 1933, to urging 'collective security through the League of Nations' and 
bitterly opposing Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement by the end of 1937. 
Following the view taken by Dalton in his diary and memoirs, therefore, Pimlott 
argues that the decisive 'turning point' was July 1937 when Dalton managed to 
81-4, 
B.Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (Cambridge, 1977), esp. pp. 4-6 
See, for instance, K.Harris, Attlee (1982), pp. 119-20; J.Schneer, George Lansbury (Manchester, 
1990), pp. 157-76; C.Bryant, Steward Cripps: Ihe First Modem Chancellor (1997), pp.124-7. 
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convince the PLP to abstain on the Service Estimates, thus giving approval to the 
national government's rearmament programme.'^ 
One of the most valuable considerations of Labour's 1935 debates is to be 
found in John Shepherd's little-known article 'Labour and the Trade Unions'. This 
analyses the events leading to the bitter confrontation between Lansbury and Bevin at 
the 1935 party conference. In doing so it gives a sense of the dramatic and passionate 
nature of the debate, and convincingly argues that in 1935 the forces of pacifism 
within the Labour party were overwhelmingly defeated. However, the limited scope of 
his article does not provide him with the opportunity to question whether 1935 might 
have been a climacteric for Labour in any wider sense. 
A thorough examination of the debates over the imposition of sanctions against 
Italy and their significance has yet to be undertaken. The implicit consensus in the 
existing literature is such that the various different aspects of these debates have been 
little studied, and their significance diminished in comparison to later developments. 
This orthodox emphasis remains in general works on the Labour party, notably 
Andrew Thorpe's A History of the British Labour Party.There has been no 
consideration of these events in the depth that Tom Buchanan's The Spanish Civil 
War and the British Labour Movement has covered a slightly later period. There is, 
therefore, a pressing need for a re-evaluation of the intra-party dispute over League 
sanctions. 
B.Pimlott, HughDalton (1985), ch. 15, esp. pp. 225, 242. 
J. Shepherd, 'Labour and the Trade Unions: George Lansbury, Ernest Bevin and the leadership Crisis 
of 1935', in C.Wrigley and J.Shepherd (eds ), On the Move (1991), p.204-230. 
A. Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (1997), ch. 4. 
'^T.Buchanan, The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement (Cambridge, 1992). 
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Chapter one explains the context in which these debates were conducted. It 
shows how the Labour party had long based its foreign policy on the League of 
Nations without seriously considering in what ways this international organisation 
would work to check aggression. The chapter also describes the institutional tensions 
within the party after 1931, which influenced the character of the 1935 debates. 
Chapters two, three and four then analyse, in turn, the arguments developed since 
1933 by the leaders of the three feuding factions - pacifists, the Sociahst League, and 
those advocating a sanctionist League. Above all they explain how the pressures of 
both international events and domestic politics contrived to ensure that, when the 
Italian-Abyssinian crisis provided the spark, a passionate debate ensued. 
This thesis is based on a wider range of source material than was available for 
the last substantial study of Labour's foreign policy in the 1930s, that of Naylor in the 
1960s. His core materials were published sources: the Trades Union Congress Annual 
Reports and Labour Party Annual Conference Reports, and the parliamentary 
speeches reported in Hansard. By themselves these tend to give the impression that 
the debate was solely one about policy. More recently available private records - the 
NEC, NJC/NCL and TUC General Council minutes - have made it possible not just to 
explain the evolution of the sanctionist League policy more fially, but also to define 
the roles of the leading individuals concerned with more precision. In this respect 
these private records suggest an important revision of the established orthodoxy. They 
reveal Henderson as the chief architect of a sanctionist League policy, with Dalton, 
Citrine, Bevin and Attlee not - as existing accounts assume - the prime movers but the 
able lieutenants, only assuming the mantle at a relatively late stage. Moreover, a range 
of private paper collections has, in contrast to Naylor's account, provided the basis for 
12 
discussion of the political struggles that were taking place, as different individuals and 
bodies fought to secure adoption of their polices in order to increase their influence 
within the party. The Dalton papers containing his diary are undoubtedly the best 
example here, with their abundant references to his growing feud wdth Cripps. 
Chapter five then brings together all these themes and individuals, and 
analyses how the debate was finally resolved at the 1935 party conference. The 
conclusion offers reflections on the larger question posed in the thesis: How important 
was the shift in Labour's foreign policy that followed the conference debate on 'Italy 




In the years from the end of the Great War until the Abyssinian crisis Labour's 
foreign policy factions co-existed in relative harmony. Initially the movement was 
united in its repudiation of the Versailles Settlement, and in its tentative endorsement 
of the League of Nations. From the mid 1920s, however, differences of emphasis 
emerged. The party leadership, guided by Henderson, became firmly committed to the 
League of Nations as the lynch pin of its foreign policy. Pacifists and the Left did not 
place much faith in the League and never wholeheartedly embraced the party's new 
stance. Nevertheless, in the peaceful international climate that pervaded Europe at this 
time, they accepted it because they were able to avoid consideration of the extent of 
the powers that might be given to the League in the event of military aggression. 
Although the international environment deteriorated dramatically in 1931-2 with the 
crisis in Manchuria, the movement's delicate agreement on foreign affairs remained 
intact. For in the aftermath of the 1931 financial and political crisis, the Labour 
movement was deeply preoccupied with matters of domestic economic and social 
policy. With the rise of Hitler in 1933-4 divisions did begin to emerge within the 
movement. Henderson now sought to strengthen the party's commitment to League 
sanctions - economic and military - to check aggression. In response the Socialist 
League objected to endowing the 'capitalist' League of Nations with any such powers. 
Yet imtil the Abyssinian crisis began to loom large, intra-party discord over foreign 
policy remained largely submerged. 
14 
By 1918 the divisions that had been prominent eariier in the Great War had 
gradually healed, as the party united behind support for the creation of a League of 
Nations. The idea of a League provided a focus for the widespread hopes of a better 
fiiture that had been stimulated by the unprecedented suffering of the Great War. It 
was seen as a means of reforming international relations, of superseding the 'Old 
Diplomacy' with its secret diplomacy and systems of alliance, and of creating 
permanent international peace. The efforts of both MacDonald and Henderson ensured 
that the Labour party endorsed the concept of a League of Nations at a special 
conference in December 1917.^  The party's 1918 programme Labour and the New 
Social Order then demanded that 'a Universal League or Society of Nations' be 
established 'as a part of the Treaty of Peace'.^  
However, as the precise form of the League of Nations emerged from the 
Versailles Peace Conference, MacDonald and Henderson, at another special 
conference in April 1919, outlined an approach they were to take over the next few 
years. They gave only conditional endorsement to the League. They praised the broad 
principles of its covenant or constitution - the aspirations to prevent fiitiire wars by the 
peacefiil settlement of international disputes, to promote disarmament, to supervise 
mandated territories and to foster habits of international co-operation in the economic 
and social sphere. They also accepted the provisions under which members in dispute 
with one another were obliged to refer their differences to one of three processes 
provided by the League: to the Permanent Court of International Justice, to arbitration, 
or to enquiry by the League Council. At this stage no debate arose over Article XVI of 
the Covenant, which became the subject of much dispute in the mid-1930s. However, 
' See Marquand, MacDonald, pp. 218-222; C.Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (Cardiff, 1990), pp. 112-125. 
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MacDonald and Henderson strongly criticised the exclusion of Germany and the other 
defeated countries from membership of the League.^  
After the publication of the Versailles settlement their criticism intensified. 
They now contended that the League's foremost flaw was its connection to a 
settlement which had failed to meet the expectations of a just peace raised by 
Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points and embraced by most liberal and radical opinion. It 
seemed as though the wishes of the more narrowly nationalistic French premier, 
Georges Clemenceau, and of an ultra-patriotic Lloyd George had often prevailed at 
the Conference. As Henderson explained, the League was committed to preserve a 
status quo in which Germany was unilaterally disarmed, stripped of its colonies as 
well as certain territories in Europe, and forced to pay a level of reparations expected 
to be so high that it would probably ruin its own, and dampen the entire European, 
economy.'* 
The party leadership's stance was acceptable to different strands of opinion in 
the party, not just to the great body that had supported Britain's involvement in the 
War, but also to pacifists and left wingers. Lansbury, already one of Labour's most 
prominent pacifists, derived his pacifism and indeed his socialism from his Anglican 
Christian faith. Characteristically during the Great War he had joined the FOR which 
had argued that the spirit of God's teaching on love and redemption was contrary to 
war.^ Now, however, he found that his condemnation of the Versailles Treaty as a 
^ Labour and the New Social Order (1918), p.23. 
^ LPACR, 1919, p.26, quoted in H.R. Winkler, Paths Not Taken: British Labour and International 
Policy in the 1920s (Chapel Hill, 1994), pp. 38-9. Chs. 2 and 3 of this book explain in detail how the 
Labour party conditionally endorsed the League in the years following Versailles. 
A. Henderson, The Peace Terms (1919), pp. 6-9. 
' Ceadel, Pacifism, p.36. 
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'peace of hate'^ was perfectly consistent with the party's attitude. His fellow pacifist 
Ponsonby had defected from the Liberal to the Labour party during the Great War, 
believing that its approach to foreign affairs was more akin to his own. He held that 
moral, rather than physical, force should form the basis of international authority.^ At 
this time, however, he too was comfortably able to echo the sentiments of his new 
party in suggesting that while the League should not be dismissed out of hand, it was a 
caricature of the original idea. Those on the left - mainly belonging to the LLP - were 
more vehement in their criticism of the peace settlement than most of the party. 
Following the lead of H.N.Brailsford, one of the foremost leftist writers, they argued 
that it cruelly suppressed Germany while bolstering the position of France to such an 
extent that it might soon be able to dominate the continent of Europe. Yet, even 
though they made the logical link and asserted that the League of Nations would be 
used by capitalist and imperialist Britain and France to preserve this status quo, at this 
stage they still remained within the Labour fold.^ 
During the 1920s the Labour leadership gradually moved from a position 
where they only tentatively supported the League towards a much more positive 
endorsement of the fledging international organisation. As the party faced the prospect 
of actually holding office Henderson, working closely with the Advisory Committee 
for International Questions (ACIQ), argued that the League should be made the pivot 
of Labour's foreign policy, and the means of achieving disarmament. The ACIQ had 
been created in May 1918 as part of Henderson's reforms of the party structure. It was 
^ Daily Herald, 28 June 1919, quoted in H.R.Winkler, PathsNot Taken, p.54. 
' 'The Sanction behind a League of Nations', War and Peace, September 1918; UDC Pamphlet 41a, 
'The Covenant of the League of Nations: An Analysis with flill text, (1920), quoted in Jones, Ponsonby, 
p. 164. 
^ Winkler, Paths Not Taken, p. 72. 
' Ibid, p. 71. Brailsford's views found their fullest expression in H.N.Brailsford, After the Peace (1920). 
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to work on behalf of the NEC and 'consider, report and advise upon international 
policy and all questions of an international character, and to watch and advise upon 
current international developments'.'° Its most prominent members - Leonard Woolf 
and Philip Noel-Baker - were League enthusiasts. Woolf, the committee's secretary, 
had been an early advocate of a League, and wrote an important study of the matter in 
1916 entitled International Government Noel-Baker had been part of Lord Cecil's 
delegation at Paris in 1919 that had negotiated the creation of the League, was a 
member of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union (LNU), and had 
worked in its Secretariat in the eariy 1920s.Under their influence, as eariy as 1922, 
in Labour and Foreign Affairs, Henderson contended that by establishing definite 
procedures to ensure the implementation of the League's arbitration mechanisms a 
sense of international security could be fostered which would, in turn, allow measures 
of disarmament to be effected.'^ In 1924 when the Labour party formed its first 
government, albeit a minority one, MacDonald as prime minister decided to act as his 
own foreign secretary. Henderson, however, continued to dominate on League of 
Nations issues. As leader of the British delegation at the League Council meeting in 
September he largely shaped the Geneva Protocol.''* 
The Protocol provided that the League's compulsory arbitration mechanisms 
be backed by a commitment by League members to impose sanctions against any 
aggressor. States that refused to submit to arbitration when required to do so by the 
League Council, or which refused to abide by its decision, were to be regarded as 
Quoted in Winider, Paths Not Taken, p. 24. 
"Ibid, p. 21. 
D. J.Whittaker, Fighter for Peace: Philip Noel-Baker (York, 1989), pp. 31, 44. 
" A.Henderson, Labour and Foreign Affairs (1922), p.9. 
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aggressors. At its own discretion the Council could then apply the range of sanctions 
provided for in Article X V I of the Covenant. Crucially, though, the acceptance of 
these provisions was linked to the achievement of a definite measure of disarmament. 
A Disarmament Conference was to be held in June 1925, and it was carefully 
emphasised that the Protocol would not come into force until it had successfully 
concluded. However, the Protocol was rejected in March 1925 by the Conservative 
government, which subsequently replaced it with the Locarno Treaty - a regional 
security pact, existing outside the League and negotiated without its involvement. 
Nevertheless, Henderson's advocacy of the Protocol's underlying principles -
arbitration, security and disarmament - continued unabated.'^ 
Henderson's approach found further expression in Labour's 1928 programme 
Labour and the Nation. This pledged that a Labour government would use the 
League's provision for arbitration, underpinned by pooled security, to encourage 
disarmament.^^ As foreign secretary in MacDonald's second minority Labour 
government of 1929-31, Henderson worked to make a reality of this rhetorical 
commitment. True to the 1928 programme, at the Tenth Assembly of the League of 
Nations in September 1929, he signed the 'Optional Clause' of the League Covenant, 
thereby extending the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice to 
all legal disputes involving Great Britain. On 21 May 1931 he signed the 'General Act 
of Arbitration, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement' which took the application of 
arbitration beyond cases which could be settled by international law to other classes of 
The importance of Henderson in gradually moving the party towards this kind of realistic and 
workable foreign policy is the underlying theme of Winkler, Paths Not Taken. See in particular ch. 5 
for a discussion of the first Labour government. 
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dispute, with the overall intention of avoiding a resort to war. He had done much to 
advance the jurisdiction and credibility of the League - something that the League 
delegates recognised when, in May 1931, they unanimously invited him to preside 
over the world's first Disarmament Conference when this opened in February 1932. 
Pacifists and the Left were able to accept the direction in which Henderson 
was taking the party's foreign policy because the international environment was 
increasingly favourable. At the time the Locarno Treaty of 1925 had been criticised by 
Labour as an inadequate defensive arrangement typifying the Conservatives' purely 
nominal support for the League, but it had since become the undoubted symbol for a 
period of international calm. The Dawes Plan of 1924, which provided Germany with 
generous American loans, had gone some way to solving the difficulties over 
reparations. Franco-German trade had increased considerably and Germany, under the 
guidance of Streseman, had in 1926 been allowed to join the League. The Kellogg 
Pact of August 1928 even went so far as to commit the 14 signatory countries, 
including Britain, to the high-minded objective of outlawing war. In this climate 
pacifists in the Labour party were able to ignore the potential extent of the economic, 
and possibly military sanctions, which, under Article X V I of the Covenant, the 
League could use to try and compel submission to its arbitration procedures. 
Henderson himself recognised that there might be a need for an ultimate 
reliance on force within the League's provision for sanctions. 'Force', he told his 
Burnley constituents on 12 October 1924, 'should be used to make the decisions 
effective, i f sanity, reason, right and justice failed and these sanctions had to be 
employed'. However, in an improving international climate - perhaps even out of 
sensitivity to pacifist sentiment in the party - he had refi-ained from giving these views 
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wide currency.'^ MacDonald may have fiirther relieved pacifist anxieties. He was 
instinctively sceptical of the value of legalistic formulae and precise obligations to the 
successful operation of the League, and played down their significance to a far greater 
extent than Henderson. He believed that security could only be achieved by improving 
the international weather. This conviction led him to write that he considered the 
provision of sanctions in the Geneva Protocol as nothing more than 'a harmless drug 
to soothe the nerves'.'^ It also prompted him to overrule Henderson at the London 
Naval Conference in summer 1930 and refuse to provide the tightly-defined security 
guarantees that the French demanded as a precondition to disarmament.^ *' 
In any case, pacifists tacitly accepted the party leadership's League policy with 
its emphasis on multilateral disarmament - even though disarmament of the unilateral 
variety was the logical corollary of their beliefs. In 1921 Lansbury had been a founder 
member of the No More War Movement (NMWM), whose membership pledge 
asserted emphatically that since all war was 'wrong' the arming of any state was 
'treason to the spiritual unity of mankind'.Nevertheless, as First Commissioner of 
Works and cabinet member in the 1929-31 government he was collectively 
responsible for the government's policy on the League and disarmament.^ ^ Ponsonby 
is a still more interesting case. As Under Secretary at the Foreign Office in 1924, he 
had been unhappy with the implication of the Geneva Protocol that progress towards 
Winkler, PathsNot Taken, pp. 146-8. Henderson's speech at Burnley was subsequently published as 
A.Henderson, The New Peace Plan: Labour's Work at the League of Nations Assembly (1924). See also 
Winkler's concluding remarks, p. 196. 
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disarmament necessarily required the organisation of some form of international force. 
In 1925, therefore, he launched his Peace Letter - a petition committing its signatories 
to 'refuse to support or render war service to any government which resorts to arms'. 
He believed that he had discovered a new and truly objective form of pacifism, 
dubbed 'humanitarian' and 'utilitarian' by Ceadel.^ ^ This did not fall back on prior 
religious or political assumptions but instead made the simple calculation that the 
unhappiness and destruction caused by war would always outweigh its benefits. This 
must be so, he contended in Now is the Time, because the tremendous economic 
dislocation of the Great War had demonstrated that war always fails 'to achieve a 
single desirable objective, whatever its gigantic cost may be'.^ '* Nevertheless for the 
time being he clearly did not feel that these views were inconsistent with his faith in 
the efficacy of Labour's League policy. As Under Secretary to the Colonial and 
Dominions Office in 1929 he, too, refiised to vote against the Labour government's 
arms estimates, defending his decision to the Secretary of the Sheffield ILP; 
So long as the Labour government shows a disposition to 
reduce armaments, to pursue a policy of peace and to avoid all 
wars, so long in fact as I think they are the best government for 
advancing towards my ideal I am not...going to vote against 
the government because they won't go the whole way and 
abolish the war services at home. 
Criticism from the left on foreign policy was still more muted, despite the fact 
that the ILP had become increasingly factional, attracting those who were openly 
dissatisfied with the pohcies of the Labour party. Henderson's reforms in 1918 had 
created a provision for direct individual membership through affiliated ward and 
Ibid, pp. 80-1. See also Winkler, Paths Not Taken, p. 147. 
"^^ A.Ponsonby, Now is the time: An Appealfor Peace (1925), p. 102. 
Ponsonby to Rowson, August 1929, quoted in Ceadel, Pacifism, pp. 82-3. 
22 
constituency parties, which meant that the ILP was no longer the main way into the 
party for non-trade unionists. From 1925, under the chairmanship of the Clydesider 
Jimmy Maxton, it sought a new role as a powerhouse of sociahst ideas and veered 
sharply to the left, but in doing so lost much of its moderate support. Yet in an 
essentially peacefiil international environment most of its attention was directed 
towards social and economic policy - in particular to the development of 
underconsumptionist theories and 'Living Wage' proposals.'^ ^ In these years the LLP 
did not formulate a cogent critique of Labour's League of Nations foreign policy. 
The Labour party's fragile agreement on foreign policy might have been 
exposed by the first test of the League's ability to resolve a serious dispute. The 
conflict between Japan and China erupted suddenly in Manchuria in September 1931. 
Both states were members of the League, and China explicitly asked it to intervene. It 
was, moreover, quite clear that Japan was the aggressor. The 'Mukden incident', 
which involved the alleged sabotage of some 31 inches of Japanese-controlled 
railway, was a spurious excuse for the seizure of a large and prosperous Chinese 
province. However, the party was preoccupied with domestic affairs and willing to 
await quietly the report of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry headed by 
Lord Lytton. 
The collapse of the Labour government amid the sterling and budget crisis of 
August 1931 meant that the party was absorbed in a comprehensive consideration of 
domestic economic policy. The overriding priority here was to develop definite 
policies for the next Labour government, because the absence of these was thought to 
have allowed a difference of principle to develop within the Cabinet with catastrophic 
Pimlott, Labour and the Left, pp. 42-3. 
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consequences for the movement. Opinion had been divided as to whether a Labour 
government should follow financial orthodoxy and agree to a ten percent cut in 
unemployment benefit in order to reduce the budget deficit at this time of great 
economic depression. MacDonald felt able to endorse the cut and instead of offering 
the resignation of the whole Labour government, announced his intention to form a 
National Government with the Conservatives and some Liberals. Debate within the 
Labour party, therefore, centred on matters of economic policy. 
Divisions emerged, in particular, between the lines taken by the NEC and NJC 
on the one hand and, after its formation in 1932, by the Socialist League on the other -
the groups that would later oppose each other over foreign policy. The events of 
August 1931 and then the general election in October of that year had created 
institutional strains in the Labour movement and shifted the centre of power away 
from the PLP. The parliamentary party, which had effectively contiolled the party for 
the previous decade, was reduced to a meagre 46 MPs after the election. Of those 
remaining exactiy half were representatives of the Miners' Federation. With most of 
the experienced parliamentary leaders excluded, its composition was not unlike that of 
the pre-war party, even the LRC. MacDonald, Snowden and Thomas had, of course, 
defected to the National government. Passfield and Parmoor had decided that this was 
a suitable juncture at which to go into retirement, while Henderson, Morrison, 
Greenwood and Dalton had lost their seats in the electoral debacle. The only former 
cabinet minister to retain his seat had been Lansbury, who was duly elected as PLP 
leader in November 1931, and on Henderson's retirement in October 1932 as overall 
party leader. With the relatively junior Attlee as his deputy, and the inexperienced 
Cripps as the other leading member of the PLP, Lansbury led the small band of 
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parliamentarians that indulged in leftist rhetoric, but was increasingly overshadowed 
by the NEC as the voice of the political wing of the movement.^ ^ 
After losing their seats in October 1931, Dalton and Morrison had begun to use 
the NEC as their power base, from where they worked to develop a range of clearly 
defined, though essentially moderate, economic policies that the party could 
implement once elected. In doing this they found themselves increasingly allied with 
Bevin and Citrine on the TUC General Council. Before 1926 the Council's concerns 
had been almost wholly industrial. But in the aftermath of the General Strike, with the 
its involvement in the Mond-Tumer talks, the Macmillan committee and the 
Economic Advisory Council, the General Council, and Bevin in particular, had begun 
to take a great interest in general economic policies, even monetary policies. In 
August 1931 the General Council had played a pivotal role in convincing a minority 
of the Cabinet to resist cuts in unemployment benefit. It had, indeed, become seriously 
disillusioned with the entire parliamentary party, and begun to assert forcefully that 
the Labour party was just the political wing of the TUC. In late 1931 the TUC leaders 
seized the opportunity to formalise their position of increased influence within the 
movement. On the insistence of Citrine, the moribund NJC was reconstituted so that it 
consisted of seven members from the General Council, but only three each from the 
NEC and the Parliamentary Executive. It was also given an extended jurisdiction to 
'consider all questions affecting the Labour movement as a whole, and make 
provisions for taking immediate and joint action on all questions of national 
emergency', and to 'endeavour to secure a common policy and joint action, whether 
^•'ibid, pp. 17-8. 
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by legislation or otherwise, on all questions affecting the workers as producers, 
consumers and citizens'.^^ 
Thereafter the NEC and the NJC worked closely together and, drawing in 
particular on the work of the NEC Policy Committee, developed economic policies 
that contrasted with those suggested by the Socialist League, which characteristically 
demanded more far-reaching changes to the capitalist system. The Socialist League 
was created in October 1932 by the merger of a minority from the ILP that did not 
accept its decision to disaffiliate from the Labour party, with the Society for Socialist 
Inquiry and Propaganda (SSIP) - a think tank set up by G.D.H.Cole in June 1931 to 
supply the party with new ideas. In any case, the Labour party's Leicester 
conference of October 1932 almost totally neglected the Far Eastern Crisis; instead 
there was a bitter confrontation between the NEC-NJC and the Socialist League about 
the speed at which a Labour government should nationalise the joint-stock banks. '^ 
After the publication of the Lytton Report in October 1932 the party leadership 
began to take more interest in the Manchurian question, but not to such an extent that 
it caused a break down in the party's delicate agreement on League affairs achieved in 
the mid to late 1920s. The leadership's approach now gradually became distinct from 
that of the National government. They criticised the inaction of the Foreign Secretary, 
Simon, as the League of Nations struggled in vain to implement the Lytton Report, 
which, though mildly critical of Japan, had set out a course of conciliation whereby 
Japanese rights and interests would be recognised in an autonomous Manchuria.^^ On 
22 February 1933 a joint meeting of the TUC General Coimcil and the National 
Pimlott, iMbour and the Left, pp. 18-9, 
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Executive adopted a resolution asking for the application of an economic boycott 
against Japan imder Article X V I . " However, military sanctions were not mentioned 
either then, or later in March and April as the renewed Japanese offensive gathered 
momentum. Faith in the efficacy of economic sanctions remained firm. In the summer 
Henderson wrote retrospectively that Labour had demanded 'with all the emphasis at 
its conmiand that the covenant should be upheld against the aggression of Japan',^ "* 
but this was an exaggeration. Labour's demands for even economic sanctions had 
been decidedly infrequent as the Chinese had been forced to push for an armistice, 
which was eventually signed on 3 May 1933. In fact, the parliamentary party's interest 
in the Far Eastern crisis lay not so much in events in China itself, as in the effects on 
the World Disarmament Conference. The National government's handling of the crisis 
was said to be undermining the conference's prospects for success. This was a cry 
behind which the whole party could easily unite, particularly at a time when 
Henderson was chairing the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. In the face of 
unchecked Japanese aggression, they argued, all the powers now felt insufficiently 
secure to disarm - just as France, with its potentially powerful neighbour, had itself 
claimed for the previous decade.^ ^ Accordingly, pacifist and leftist dissent did not 
come to the fore. 
Even the rise and consolidation of Hitler's Nazi regime in Germany during 
1933-4 did not provoke explicit divisions over foreign policy to develop within the 
party. Foreign affairs inevitably did begin to assume a greater prominence in party 
discussions, but much of the discord remained implicit. Before the 1933 party 
See Attlee's comments -//:C.Z)efc, 270, col. 528, 10 November 1932. 
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conference Henderson produced a pamphlet - Labour's Foreign Policy - which 
reaffirmed and strengthened Labour's commitment to the League of Nations in the 
deteriorating international situation. For the first time he now presented an 
international police force as the basis of the pooled security that would, in turn, 
facilitate disarmament.^^ At the conference, however, Henderson's League policy was 
logically nullified by the passage of a 'war resistance' resolution introduced by 
Trevelyan on behalf of the Socialist League, which repudiated any loyalty to the 
League by arguing that: 
The League is worked by feeble and sceptical governments 
like our own, or by governments that openly deride world 
peace, like Italy and Germany. I f our present government 
would not use the League of Nations to try to check Japan, 
have we any belief at all that it would itself be checked i f it 
embroiled itself with other nations? 
And recommending that the party should therefore: 
Pledge itself to take no part in war and to resist it with the 
whole force of the Labour Movement and to seek consultation 
forthwith with the trade union and co-operative movement 
with a view to deciding and announcing what steps, including 
a general strike, are to be taken to organise the opposition of 
the organised working-class movement in the event of war or 
threat of war.-'^  
Nevertheless when Henderson came to speak on disarmament and introduce 
his policy document he welcomed the war resistance resolution stating that it marked 
'the passionate determination of this conference...that... there shall be no more war'. 
He even attempted to reconcile it with his League of Nations foreign policy by 
arguing that Trevelyan's resolution pronounced a 'new spirit', but that the League, 
See Attlee's comments - H.C.Deb, 270, cx)ls. 526-7, 10 November 1932. 
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through its system of 'collective obligations', continued to provide the 'long-term 
policy of organising the world for peace'.Clearly Henderson was keen to avoid a 
heated wrangle over foreign policy and preferred, for the time being, to continue to 
gloss over the fundamental differences that had been tentatively exposed. Perhaps he 
was aware that most Labour politicians had yet to perceive the tremendous 
implications that the very nature of Hitler's state necessarily brought to foreign policy 
and would not have appreciated a prolonged conference debate on the matter. While 
Hitler had moved with great certainty, working quickly after the passage of the 
Enabling Act in March 1933 to bring all aspects of German life under the control of 
his party, the first Labour reactions had been confused. It seems likely that much of 
the party was prevented from producing an unequivocal response by the belief it had 
clung to since Versailles, that certain of the national grievances against which Hitler 
campaigned should be redressed. 
During the following year, in a context where Hitler's dramatic withdrawal 
from both the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on 14 October 
1933 boded i l l for the long-term prospects of international peace, Henderson renewed 
his efforts to commit the party to a strong League of Nations policy. In the first six 
months of 1934 he shaped a report - War and Peace - produced by a joint sub-
committee of Labour's three Executives. This stressed that Labour's foreign policy 
remained firmly grounded upon the collective peace system of the League of Nations, 
nominally reconciled this with war resistance, but in such a way that this resistance 
would only operate in certain very limited conditions. Significantly, War and Peace 
also acknowledged that in the interim period before an international League police 
38 Ibid, pp. 188-91. 
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force replaced national armed forces Britain might have to use its own military and 
naval forces in support of the League in restraining an aggressor nation. This was a 
tentative statement of the case for a sanctionist League which would be made with 
respect to the Abyssinian Crisis the following year and, as Henderson recognised, it 
was a new departure. At this stage, however, there was no immediate aggressor who 
needed to be restrained - the threat that Hitler presented was a potential one for the 
future. Accordingly, at the party conference in October Henderson feh able to present 
War and Peace, which was incorporated into Labour's new programme For Socialism 
and Peace, in a conciliatory maimer in order to temper potential criticism. He argued, 
disingenuously, that he was 'not putting forward a new policy' but merely 'restating 
Labour's aims and Labour's policy' and adding 'a little emphasis here and there'. He 
added, moreover, that 'we have not abandoned the idea of the general strike, nor have 
we in any way repudiated the Hastings resolution'."^^ His tack was successful; for the 
time being the party's delicate consensus on foreign affairs remained in place. 
William Mellor's short speech attacking reliance on the League of Nations was the 
Socialist League's only coimter attack.'*' In response to the introduction of For 
Socialism and Peace, Cripps criticised the hmited nature of its proposals to reorganise 
the domestic economy, but made no mention of its stance towards the League of 
Nations."*^ 
After this point the influence of Henderson began to decline. He was now in 
his seventies and suffering from almost constant i l l heath. Indeed, he died just over a 
year later, in October 1935. The key figures on the National Executive and the 
Cowling, Impact of Hitler, pp.25-6; Naylor, Labour's International Policy pp. 48-9. 
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National Council of Labour (as the NJC was known after July 1934) - Dalton, Attlee, 
Bevin and Citrine - now became the party's leading proponents of a sanctionist 
League. During late simimer 1935 they found themselves, in the face of determined 
pacifist and leftist opposition, pushing for the implementation of the sanctions -
including military ones - that War and Peace had tentatively endorsed in order to 
check the impending Italian aggression. 
The deep-seated foreign policy divisions within the movement had only come 
to the fore with the general realisation that Mussolini was intent on attacking 
Abyssinia - a fellow member of the League. Mussolini had, in fact, been building up 
his forces in North Africa since the clash at Wal-Wal in December 1934. He was 
determined to inflict a crushing victory on Abyssinia in order, he claimed, to secure 
access to its raw materials, but in reality to bolster the domestic prestige of his fascist 
regime. Haile Selassie, the Abyssinian Emperor, had first referred the dispute to the 
League as early as January 1935. Until June, however, the Labour party remained 
preoccupied with the threat from Germany that had been growing steadily more 
ominous throughout the year. In March, for instance. Hitler had announced that, in 
contravention of the Versailles Treaty, a German Air Force now existed and that 
military conscription was being introduced. Now as the League Council made moves 
to take up the Italian-Abyssinian dispute, the Labour party also began to turn its 
attention to this more immediately pressing matter. 
However, by this stage the National government - in response to the 
armouncement of the results of the Peace Ballot in late June - was beginning to take a 
pro-League stance and this greatly shaped the subsequent debate within the Labour 
"^Ibid, pp. 158-60. 
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party. The Ballot demonstrated, as its leading organisers Gilbert Murray and Lord 
Cecil of the League of Nations Union (LNU) had hoped, massive support for the 
policy of collective security. Of the 11.6 million people who had voted, over 11.1 
million were in favour of Britain remaining a member of the League and 10 million 
were ready to support economic and other non-mihtary sanctions against an aggressor. 
Even on the controversial question of military sanctions, nearly seven million were 
ready to enforce them as against 2.3 million who voted 'no' and 2.4 million who were 
doubtful.'*^ The results undoubtedly provided a context in which Labour's advocates 
of a sanctionist League felt able to demand a firm commitment to the League 
sanctions that their party had only tentatively endorsed in the previous year. The 
Labour movement had, in any case, associated itself with the Ballot when polling 
began in November 1934, in sharp contrast to the National government which had 
taken a decidedly ambivalent attitude.'*'' Now, however, the results influenced the 
thinking of Baldwin, who had replaced MacDonald as prime minister in June. He 
abandoned the government's earlier reticence and actively endorsed the notion of 
collective security in an attempt to win over this 'League of Nations' vote ahead of the 
general election that was due before November 1936 but expected at any time."*^  On 
23 July he asserted that 'the foreign policy of this government is founded upon the 
League of Nations'.'*^ This meant that when Labour's three Executives met on 3-4 
September and, influenced by Dalton, Attlee, Bevin and Citrine, drafted a resolution 
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demanding the use of the full range of League sanctions against Mussolini they were 
asking the party to support a line that they struggled to distinguish from that of the 
National government. 
This was the context in which pacifist and Socialist League criticism of the 
NEC-NCL line intensified. The TUC meeting on 5 September endorsed the resolution 
by 2,962,000 votes to 102,000 - just six days before Hoare, the foreign secretary, 
announced at the League Council meeting on 11 September the government's 
'unwavering fidelity to the League' and its subsequent commitment to 'collective 
resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression'.'*^ In the years since 1932 the twists 
and turns of international events and domestic politics had driven both the pacifists, 
Ponsonby and Lansbury, and the Socialist League under the leadership of Cripps 
gradually to develop views on foreign policy that opposed the official party line. Now, 
with the party conference due to meet at Brighton on 30 September, these hitherto 
understated divisions looked set to come to a head. 
Quoted in R. A.C.Parker, 'Great Britain, France and the Ethiopian Crisis 1935-6', English Historical 
Review, 1974 (89), p.298. 
7actofHitler,p.S9. 
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Quoted in Cowhng, Impact of Hitler, p. 89 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE PACIFIST CRITIQUE 
After 1931 the Labour party's most prominent pacifists, Lansbury and 
Ponsonby, led the party in the two Houses of Parliament. From as early as 1932 
Ponsonby, inspired by his 'humanitarian' pacifism, used his position to criticise the 
party's support for multilateral disarmament and to call for unilateral moves. After the 
acceptance of War and Peace in October 1934 he coupled these demands with an 
attack on the impracticality of League sanctions, arguing that the diverse national 
interests of the powers would always prevent them from working together. He 
repeated these charges with increasing vehemence as Dalton and his allies moved 
towards a policy of military and economic sanctions against Italy in summer 1935. In 
contrast to Ponsonby, Lansbury did not find his Christian pacifism incompatible with 
party policy until the party theoretically committed itself to the use of sanctions at the 
1934 party conference. Thereafter he tried to distance himself from the party line, 
often by endorsing party policy, but then inserting a personal reservation. It was only 
in August and September 1935 that his complete inability to endorse the party's 
sanctionist League policy became apparent. 
In 1932 Ponsonby was prompted to call for unilateral disarmament by the 
deterioration of the international environment caused by the Manchurian crisis and by 
the cumbersome progress of the Disarmament Conference. Since Henderson's 
monumental efforts were tied up with the search for disarmament of the muhilateral 
variety in Geneva, Ponsonby now found himself, in contrast to the 1920s, seriously at 
odds with party policy. While he was, at this stage, the only prominent member of the 
34 
Labour party to make such objections, within the wider pacifist movement he was one 
of many to assert their beliefs more passionately under the pressure of international 
events. Perhaps most sensationally in February 1932 Herbert Gray, Maude Royden 
and the Rev. R.H.L 'Dick' Sheppard, influenced partly by Gandhi's exploits in India, 
made ill-fated plans to form a 'Peace Army' of unarmed passive resisters to intercede 
between Japanese and Chinese armed forces.' 
In 1925 Ponsonby had not supported unilateral disarmament, writing that he 
'would neither vote for, nor advocate, the abolition of the standing army and the 
scrapping of the navy', because 'public opinion is not ready for such a step'.^ Now, 
however, he was emphatic that a 'more senseless and dangerous policy than reduction 
of armaments by international agreements cannot be imagined' because 'in this matter 
of disarmament there is no half-way house'.^ He contended that since democratic 
opinion was naturally peacefiil unless inflamed by governmental propaganda - a view 
he had expressed in his 1928 book Falsehood in Wartime - unilateral disarmament 
could lead to the elimination of international aggression. So far as Manchuria was 
concerned, therefore, it was clear to Ponsonby that: 
Had China been unarmed, had no Chinese been able to fire a 
single shot, Japan had she attacked China would have been a 
self-confessed aggressor before all the world, including her 
own people. Knowing therefore that she could not bamboozle 
her own people by any possible pretence that an armed attack 
in a completely unarmed people was not aggression, she 
would never have attempted to take such action. 
Ceadel, Pacifism, pp. 87-8, 93-5. 
Ponsonby, Now is the Time, p. 173. 
A.Ponsonby, Disarmament: A Discussion (1928), pp.26-7. 
A.Ponsonby in New World, March 1932, quoted in Ceadel, Pacifism, p.90. 
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On 10 May 1932 he criticised the British government in the House of Lords 
for taking a qualitative approach to disarmament - that is to say, suggesting only the 
prohibition of certain kinds of weapon and methods of warfare - and went on to call 
for unilateral disarmament. Since his 'humanitarian' pacifism showed him that 'war 
settles nothing...victors and vanquished alike suffer and nobody really wins', and 
since he held that public opinion was fundamentally peaceful, he thought that 'a 
nation - preferably... my own - should act on its own responsibility and renounce the 
war weapon now'.^ Ponsonby was well aware that he strongly diverged from the 
official party line of support for the Disarmament Conference. Henderson 'expressed 
disapproval' of the line he had taken in his speech and reproached him, as leader in 
the Lords, for speaking on his own, rather than the party's, behalf Ponsonby felt so 
strongly about his anomalous position that he offered his resignation as leader in the 
Lords to Lansbury in June 1932, although the National Executive promptly refiised to 
accept it.^ 
Even with the rise of Hifler's regime Ponsonby continued to present unilateral 
disarmament as the ultimate panacea to the potential problems of world aggression. 
Speaking in the House of Lords on 27 July 1933 he stressed his unceasing faith in the 
inherently peaceful nature of public opinion. He remarked that although 'the existing 
situation in Germany [was] deplorable in many ways', he was 'not apprehensive 
because of what is going on in Germany' because he did 'not believe for one moment 
that that nation or any other nation has got aggressive designs'. When he then urged 
' HL Deb, 84, cols. 355-65, 10 May 1932. 
* Ponsonby papers, Ms Eng. Hist.c.673/109-112 contain a correspondence between Ponsonby and 
Henderson discussing their confrontation over Ponsonby's speech. R.A. Jones, Arthur Ponsonby: The 
Politics of Life (1989), p.192-3 also details Henderson's criticism of Ponsonby and the latter's 
attempted resignation. 
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the government to 'take a bold initiative...to prevent the breakdown of the 
Disarmament Conference' in order to 'bring the world to peace', it was clear he was 
thinking in terms of unilateral disarmament.' By the time of the debate on War and 
Peace at the 1934 Labour party conference he had had longer to contemplate the rise 
of Nazism, yet still moved a resolution in favour of 'disarmament by example'.^ 
After the acceptance of War and Peace by the party conference in October 
1934 Ponsonby's divergence from official party policy increased. Now that the party 
was theoretically committed to the use of economic, financial and, tentatively, military 
sanctions under the auspices of the League to check aggression, Ponsonby made clear 
his belief that such a course was impracticable. In the House of Lords on 5 December 
1934 he explained that he was in favour of a 'common condemnation' by the League 
'of any action on the part of a so-called aggressor' because this was like 'a vote of 
censure on the part of the world against that nation, and that vote of censure, even i f it 
is not supported by any action at all, has a considerable effect on the prestige and 
amour propre of the nation in question'. However, so far as sanctions were concerned 
he foresaw 'considerable difficulty'. He did not make 'any very clear distinction 
between economic and military sanctions, because any drastic economic sanction 
would in the long run always lead to military sanction'. The debacle over the Far East 
had confirmed Ponsonby in his long-held conviction that it would be very difficult to 
'get a corporate agreement on the part of all powers which are members of the League 
of Nations to take military action or economic action against a recalcifrant power 
which may be openly condemned as breaker of the peace'. Their 'particular economic 
'HLDeb, 88, cols. 1188-9, 1191-2, 27 July 1933. 
^LPACR, 1934, p. 168. 
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interests in connection with that power will not allow them freely to join in military or 
economic action against that power'.' 
As the prospect of Italian aggression in Abyssinia began to loom large, 
Ponsonby's views came under serious attack. His assertion of the impracticality of 
collective security and his positive belief in disarmament by example was privately 
criticised by Dalton and Citrine at a social meeting at the end of July 1935 in of all 
places the Russian Embassy.'° By the time the three Executives met on 3-4 September 
to determine their policy towards Italy, Ponsonby had already made explicit his 
objection to the use of the range of League sanctions in this case. In a letter in The 
Times on 28 August 1935 he stressed that such an approach was seriously flawed. He 
held that 'unanimity... for collective action cannot be reached'. The past 15 years had 
shown him that there 'wi l l always be some nations guided very naturally by self-
interest who for economic or political reasons will be reluctant to quarrel with a 
neighbour or friend, even should that neighbour be condemned as an aggressor'. This 
meant that so far as the Italian-Abyssinian dispute was concerned 'nothing would be 
more clumsy and ill-advised than for Great Britain precipitately...to take the lead in 
proposing eventual sanctions' - it would only foster tension with those nations that 
were not inclined to follow. Since a British lead was far from certain to be followed it 
was likely to be regarded as provocative, and yet empty, 'bravado'. The answer, 
claimed Ponsonby, was to work through the ordinary channels of diplomacy to find a 
solution. Pessimistically he believed that ' i f we fail and Mussolini is determined on 
ruining his country for the sake of a cheap triumph over ill-armed African tribes. 
' H L Deb, 95, col. 154, 5 December 1934. Here Ponsonby was developing a line of thought that he had 
adumbrated earlier in the year - seei/L Deb, 91, cols. 367-8, 15 March 1934. 
10 Jones, Ponsonby p. 204. 
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neither the League nor any combination of nations can stop him without a disastrous 
extension of the area of war'. He thought that dictatorships necessarily had a short 
lifespan and so the best policy was to 'keep our heads, avoid hysteria, look far enough 
ahead and prevent at all costs the creation of far more serious international dissension 
which may lead to a European conflagration'.'' 
After the three Executives agreed on a sanctionist League policy on 3-4 
September Ponsonby decided that it was best for him to resign his leadership in the 
Lords - a decision he made public on 17 September. He claimed that 'serious 
differences with the party on all the more important points of foreign policy and on 
the decision they have made in the present grave international crisis' made it 
impossible for him to continue.'^ A private memorandum, which Ponsonby wrote on 4 
November, entitled 'Why I Resigned' provides one side of the explanation for his 
action. In this he emphasised that his belief in the sheer impracticability of economic 
and military sanctions was his primary objection to the party's policy. He reiterated 
his assertion that sanctionist League action was bound to be 'ineffective and merely 
aggravate the situation', and 'extend instead of restrict the area of warfare'. With 
greater clarity than was discernible in his earlier public pronouncements, Ponsonby 
recorded that he was unable to place any faith in the League because it was 'not all-
inclusive' with 'three great nations being outside', and because there was no way in 
which sanctions, in any case, 'could not be undertaken immediately'." 
" The Times, 28 August 1935, Ponsonby had used the same arguments in a draft letter to an unnamed 
acquaintance dated 6 August 1935 - see Ponsonby papers Ms Eng. Hist. c. 676/91-3, 
The Times, 19 September 1935, See also Ponsonby to Lansbury, 17 September 1935, Lansbury 
papers 28a. 
'Why I Resigned', 4 November 1935, Ponsonby papers Ms Eng. Hist. c. 676/193-4. 
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In his diary, however, Ponsonby recorded another underlying reason for his 
resignation. It would enable him to devote his energies to pacifist activities and free 
himself from the responsibilities of what he considered his 'very inferior position of 
leader in the Lords'. He had been tempted to take such a course in 1932 and so in a 
sense clearly felt it was 'easier for me now'.''* The Labour party in the Lords, 
consisting of only 12 members, was numerically tiny, not least because the party was 
out of office and had in opposition renewed its attack on the House of Lords as an 
institution, so that it could not recommend appointment of new peers. Perhaps as the 
only active Labour peer with any substantial ministerial and parliamentary experience, 
Ponsonby had feh a certain duty to continue as leader, from which he now felt 
absolved by his deep objection to a sanctionist League policy. 
Ponsonby was in an undoubtedly strong position to become a spokesman for 
the wider pacifist movement, being widely admired by a younger generation of 
recruits to pacifism - among them the writers and publicists Beverley Nichols, Storm 
Jameson and A. A. M i l n e . T h e organisation of the Peace Ballot had, by now, also 
forced many strands within the pacifist movement to define, and then push, their 
views more forcefully. The Manchurian crisis had discredited the NMWM's belief in 
the power of moral sanctions to prevent war, and it had since then maintained a 
somewhat hazy faith in the efficacy of economic sanctions. Once polling for the Ballot 
was underway in November 1934, however, doubts arose about whether there were 
any economic sanctions that were mild enough to be acceptable to pacifists and yet 
strong enough to be effective. It was, for example, only in March 1935 that Dr Alfred 
Ponsonby diary, 4 September 1935, quoted in Jones, Ponsonby, p. 204. 
" Ibid, p. 200. Indeed in October 1933 Nichols had written to Ponsonby and told him how he often 
gained hope and inspiration fi-om his example - Nichols to Ponsonby, 2 October 1933, ibid. 
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Salter, a Labour MP and prominent member of the NMWM, announced his change of 
mind and began to press for a 'no' vote to the question asking about economic 
sanctions.'^ Similarly, this period also saw the emergence of Dick Sheppard's 'New 
Pacifism', when he responded to the organisation of the Peace Ballot and called, on 16 
October 1934, for postcards to reassure him that: 'We renounce war and never again, 
directly or indirectly, wil l we support or sanction another'. The response was 
impressive and in July 1935 he held a rally for the 50,000 signatories in the Albert 
Hall and formed the Sheppard Peace Movement.'' This was the wider movement 
within which Ponsonby presumably hoped to increase his standing after speaking at 
the party conference. 
In contrast to Ponsonby's persistent, i f undramatic, disagreement with 
Labour's foreign policy in the years after 1931, Lansbury's initial reaction to the 
Manchurian crisis, the rise of Hitler, and the subsequent collapse of the Disarmament 
Conference, did not alienate him from the rest of the Labour party. Lansbury did not 
try to hide his pacifism. It was just that in the years 1931-3 the party's foreign policy 
included a broad range of opinion - Ponsonby had only stepped outside it by pushing 
his views so forcefully. 
There was, very briefly, a possibility that the Labour party's demand for the 
imposition of economic sanctions against Japan in February 1933 would separate 
Lansbury from the mainstream of the party. His first biographer and son-in-law. 
Ceadel, Pacifism, pp.87, 155-6. 
Ibid, pp. 177-180. See also M.Pugh, 'Pacifism and Politics 1931-5', HistoricalJoumal, 23 (1980) p 
654, 
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Postgate, speculated that Lansbury had serious doubts about whether he could agree to 
these since they seemed likely to lead to military sanctions.'^ Certainly when he duly 
demanded an embargo on arms and ammunition against Japan in the House of 
Commons he felt the need to stress that 'as a pacifist, I should not send them to either 
side'.'' This was an early example of Lansbury's tendency to voice the party's view 
and then add a personal reservation. At this stage, however, foreign policy was not the 
Labour party's priority - its subsequent demands for action against Japan were almost 
as half-hearted as the National government's course was ineffectual - and this 
prevented these divisions from rising to the fore. 
Otherwise Lansbury remained comfortably within the Labour consensus. His 
insistent and passionate advocacy of disarmament was acceptable to the body of the 
party, even i f he sometimes went beyond its endorsement of multilateral disarmament 
and tentatively proposed unilateral renunciation of arms. In a letter to The Times in 
March 1933, for example, he emphasised that as a pacifist accepting the words of 
Christ, 'those who take the sword perish by the sword', he hoped that 'we British 
Christians wil l give up all reliance on force, cease to manufacture poison gas, give up 
building ships and other instruments of war'.^° He was quick to criticise Hitler's 
regime. During the party's May Day Demonsfration in 1933 he expressed the view 
that 'fascism with all its nonsensical talk about nationalism is the gospel of decadence 
R.Postgate, A Life of George Lansbury (1951), pp. 286-7. 
^^HCDeb, 275, col. 46, 27 February 1933. 
^° The Times, 16 March 1933. J.Schneer, George Lansbury (Manchester, 1990), ch. 3, accepts the view 
also advanced in this thesis that Lansbury desired unilateral disarmament. In contrast, Postgate, 
Lansbury, p, 287, holds that Lansbury 'was not.. .in favour of unilateral disarmament; he wished British 
armament lowered to the very Plimsoll line of safety (which he probably would have drawn low) but he 
was not (despite occasional rash rhetoric) in favour of Britain going naked in an armed world'. 
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and despair'.^' Later he stated categorically that 'we hate fascism and all the brutal 
tyranny of dictatorship wherever practised'.Yet since he qualified his criticism by 
attributing the rise of fascism and the 'war spirit' in Europe to the 'economic 
nationalism fostered and developed by the brutal, cynical peace treaties which 
smashed up the old European boundaries and sowed the seeds of the difficulties 
confronting us today',^^ this hardly changed his approach to foreign affairs. After 
Hitler walked out of the Disarmament Conference in October 1933, he commented 
that the 'best way of strengthening fascism is to treat Germany stupidly by giving 
Germany the impression that she is not regarded as on an equality with other nations'. 
He had lost none of his passion for unilateral disarmament. Even now he demanded 
that 'the British government shall take the lead and call upon all its associates 
themselves to disarm, and thus carry out the pledges given to Germany in 1919',^ '* and 
that Britain should make unilateral plans to abolish all aerial warfare.^^ When he 
spoke on the issue in the House of Commons he was rather more reticent but 
nevertheless called for: 
A large and important reduction in the expenditure of all 
nations on armed forces, for the general abolition of all 
weapons forbidden to Germany...for the abolition of military 
aircraft... and the suppression of all private manufacture of and 
trade in arms, and for strict international inspection and control 
of the execution of the Disarmament Treaty. 
At a time when the Labour party conference in October 1933 had 
simultaneously endorsed Henderson's document on Labour's Foreign Policy and 
^'Da/7vi/emW,8May 1933. 
Daily Herald, 20 October 1933. 
Daily Herald, 9 September 1933. For similar comments Manchester Guardian, 31 July 1933. 
Daily Herald, 20 October 1933. 
Manchester Guardian, 2 November 1933. 
HCDeb, 281, col. 79, 7 November 1933. 
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Trevelyan's war resistance resolution, Lansbury's tentative demands for unilateral 
disarmament inspired by Christian pacifism merely constituted an alternative gloss on 
the party's somewhat confused foreign policy. Lansbury was himself particularly in 
tune with the war resistance resolution on both pacifist and socialist grounds. Just 
three weeks before the conference Lansbury argued that the 'workers must in no 
circumstances take part in a capitalist war' because a war of this kind 'must always 
mean ruin for the toiling masses'.^' 
Lansbury's position became considerably more precarious once the party, as a 
whole, began to move towards support for the kind of strong League detailed in the 
War and Peace document. He was i l l and in hospital fi^om December 1933 until July 
1934 and so played no part in its drafting, but now began to have serious doubts about 
his position, which he expressed in a personal letter to the party secretary, Jim 
Middleton: 
I feel strongly that those who have drafted the chapters [of 
For Socialism and Peace] should be in charge and will be 
quite satisfied i f the whole thing is taken up without me...I 
think we have been all wrong for centuries. The only path to 
peace is not to fight...our people must give up all right to hold 
any other country, renounce all imperialism and stand 
unarmed before the world. She will then become the strongest 
nation in the world, ftally armed by justice and love.^^ 
He was, however, at this stage reluctant to voice his pacifist dissent from the 
party's policy. He spoke at the TUC meeting in September 1934 as the fi-ateraal 
delegate but did not mention foreign affairs. Similarly at the party's 1934 Southport 
Birmingham Post, 9 September 1933. Schneer, Lansbury, ch. 3, explains the connection between 
Lansbury's socialism and his pacifism. 
Lansbury to Middleton, 9 August 1934, Middleton papers, quoted in Shepherd, 'Labour and the 
Trade Unions', p.217. 
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conference 'he was asked to speak on peace, but backed out'.^^ At other times his 
divergence on foreign policy was apparent. His claim that there was 'no escape from 
the horrors of the war except by a refusal to take part in or sanction war'^° was hardly 
compatible with the scenario of a League war that War and Peace tentatively 
broached. His personal belief in unilateral disarmament was sometimes barely 
qualified. He admitted that i f he 'would stand before the world imarmed', but was told 
by his colleagues that such a view was 'impracticable'.^^ For the most part, however, 
Lansbury did not stray from the mainstream of Labour views on foreign policy. He 
continued to call for multilateral disarmament, with the proviso that Britain should 
offer a lead by making plans to abolish aerial warfare,^^ and coupled these demands 
with calls for a world economic conference to discuss the control of raw materials and 
the sharing of markets.^ ^ Since it was clear to Lansbury that the 'main causes of war 
are economic' this led him to criticise the imperialism that imderpinned it. In the quest 
for raw materials and markets 'Japan, Germany, Italy all clamour for a place in the 
sun'. Lansbury's socialist belief was that 'there is room for everybody' and that 
Britain, with its world-wide Empire had a duty to lead the way in sidelining private 
enterprise and indicate its willingness 'to share the territories under our flag and the 
markets we control with the rest of the world'. The cormection between the two sides 
of Lansbury's thought was obvious. What would be essentially an 'economic League 
Dalton diary, 'Note on Year 1934'; Dalton, Fateful Years p.55. 
Manchester Guardian, 8 November 1934. 
^' Daily Herald, 6 April 1935. 
^^HCDeb, 299, col. 1395, 21 March 1935; Daily Herald, 11 February 1935, 6May 1935, 18 May 
1935. 
Manchester Guardian, 1 April 1935; We Scotsman, 17 April 1935, Daily Herald, 5 July 1935. 
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of Nations' would be able 'to control the distribution of raw materials needed for the 
production of armaments, and so prevent their manufacture'. '^^  
It seems likely that Lansbury was reticent in asserting his pacifist credentials 
because, so long as the question of applying the sanctions specified in War and Peace 
could be evaded, he was determined to remain loyal to a party that he felt badly 
needed his leadership. It was only when the very real possibility of a League war 
against Italy arose that Lansbury felt he could no longer gloss over his differences 
with the party's policy. Perhaps it was an appreciation of the potential difficulty that 
prompted Lansbury at a meeting of the party's International Sub-committee on 13 
February 1935 to advise against Philip Noel Baker's suggestion that the party might 
usefiiUy make a declaration on the Italian-Abyssinian crisis. In any case the first 
indication of Lansbury's inability to endorse Labour policy publicly came when he 
spoke in the House on 1 August 1935. He asked 'the government that they should, 
without reservation, stand loyally by the League Covenant and all that that imphed', 
but found it necessary to qualify this by saying that he was 'not anxious to send the 
fleet or increase the fleet anywhere'. 
With the three Executives thought likely to draw up a resolution demanding 
the full range of League sanctions against Italy when they met before the Margate 
TUC, Lansbury asserted his pacifist convictions passionately in a letter to the editor of 
The Times on 19 August. Now that war between Italy and Abyssinia was generally 
thought to be 'unavoidable', Lansbury explicitly linked his Christian pacifism with the 
demand for economic justice. He appealed, once again, for a world economic 
Manchester Guardian, 15 July 1935 and The Times, 15 July 1935. 
NEC minutes, 26 February 1935. 
HCDeb, 304, col. 2894, 1 August 1935. 
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conference to be convened under the auspices of the League. He also suggested that 
the Archbishops should 'appeal to his Holiness the Pope to join in and call a solemn 
convocation or congress representative of every phase of Christian and other religious 
thought, call the gathering to meet in the Holy Land at Jerusalem, and from Mount 
Calvary "call a truce of God" and bid the war spirit rest'. He then coimected the two 
lines of thought by contending that economic appeasement was 'the Christian way 
out'. The demand for a fairer distribution of the world's resources was an expression 
of the Christian ideals of love, reconciliation and atonement. Certainly this was how 
Lansbury was thinking when he suggested that mankind should 'hear the word of God 
calling all nations to turn away from strife and pursue the path of co-operation'. There 
were 'enough raw materials, enough markets for us all' and so 'with the true Christian 
spirit applied the white and coloured races can cooperate to create a better civilisation 
than has yet been dreamed o f 
For the time being Lansbury sometimes still expressed the party's view rather 
than his own. When, for example, on 21 August, he met Hoare to discuss the Italian-
Abyssinian dispute he asked whether Britain was 'going to make quite clear our 
position, that is to say, were we going to state publicly our adherence to our League 
obligations'?^^ After the meeting of the three Executives, Ponsonby found Lansbury 
very despondent, feeling trapped by his leadership. He was the fraternal delegate at 
the TUC, but was warned in advance by Citrine not to state his own views.''° After 
Citrine then subsequently contended in his speech to the Congress that to reject the 
" The Times, 19 August 1935. Ceadel, Pacifism, pp. 188-90, details these developments and describes 
Lansbury as the 'pioneer and leader' of economic and Christian appeasement, which quickly 'became 
the panacea with the broadest range of support in the peace movement'. 
Hoare memorandum, 21 August 1935, PRO, FO 800/295/114-5, copy supplied by Dr 
P.A.Williamson. 
^' A.Ponsonby diary, 4 September 1935, quoted in Jones, Ponsonby, p.204. 
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policy would be 'turning down our leader, George Lansbury''*', Lansbury's 
compromised position was clear. In his own speech to the Congress he could only 
explain that in spite of the 'views any of us hold in the long run, when we speak on 
behalf of the movement we can only state what the opinion and decision of the 
movement is'. He then stressed the aspects of the policy that he endorsed, particularly 
the call for an economic conference.'*^ 
Following the TUC meeting Lansbury seriously contemplated resigning the 
party leadership.'*^ Thereafter he expounded his pacifist viewpoint more forcefully. He 
gave a press interview on 8 September, without consulting his colleagues or the party 
executive, in which he made it abundantly clear that under no circumstances could he 
'support the use of armed force, either by the League of Nations or by individual 
nations'. He explained his failure to state his views explicitly earlier by claiming that 
he had faced a dilemma. When speaking on behalf of the party he had always felt 
bound by loyalty to voice its policy, but on other occasions to try to make it clear that 
'on this most important issue I did not agree with the use of force in international 
affairs'. After the debate on the Italian-Abyssinian question at the TUC, however, he 
found his position 'very difficult indeed'. The difference of opinion was so great that 
his colleagues 'may feel that it is imperative that they should have someone as leader 
who wil l speak for them with conviction on the subject'.'*'* Rumours now aboimded 
that Lansbury would resign before the party conference. '*^  He did not, however, offer 
his resignation now for the same reason that he had held back from explicitly 
W.Citrine, Men and Work (1964), p.351; ?ostgate, Lansbury, pp. 299-300. 
TUCAR, 1935, p,371. 
Ibid, p. 407. 
Postgate, Lansbury, p. 300, claims that Lansbury 'spent 48 hours in self examination'. 
Manchester Guardian, and The Times, both 9 September 1935. 
See, for example. News Chronicle, 12 September 1935. 
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expressing his pacifist dissent from War and Peace. He was 'torn between loyalty to a 
great life-long conviction and loyalty to a movement'"^^ at a time when he thought he 
fulfilled an indispensable role in the party. He realised the difficulty in which his 
departure from office would place the party. There was nothing even approaching 
agreement on who, amongst the Labour MPs, should succeed Lansbury and there was, 
in any case, a general election expected at any time that was likely to alter the 
composition of the pariiamentary party. 
In the meantime Lansbury asserted publicly his long-held belief that unilateral 
disarmament offered the best chance for peace. He now recanted his eariier tacit 
consent to Labour policy. He openly revealed that the 'only months I have to regret in 
my life were the few short months I was in the government when I had to vote for 
armaments'. He had had to salve his conscience.''^  Moreover, at a demonstration 
organised by the FOR and the Council of Christian Pacifist Groups on 13 September 
he boldly stated that: 
I f I were prime minister, backed by the majority of the House 
of Commons, I would go myself to the Assembly of the 
League of Nations and say: 'Our nation once and for all 
renounces armaments and war, and is prepared at once to 
disarm and invites all other nations to follow our lead'.''* 
Lansbury was acutely aware of the difficult position he now occupied. His 
xmease could only have been exacerbated by the resignations of his fellow pacifist 
dissenter, Ponsonby, from the leadership in the Lords. Lansbury raised the question of 
his continued leadership at a meeting of the NEC, but was offered no easy way out of 
his predicament. He was told that it was a matter for the PLP, but that ' in the opinion 
News Chronicle, 9 September 1935. 
Western Mail, 23 September 1935. 
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of the NEC, there is no reason why he should tender his resignation'.'*^ They evidently 
did not, as Dalton put it, want 'the onus of pushing him out'.^° In a letter to Middleton 
in September Lansbury wrote of the 'quite impossible' situation in which 'we are 
forced to contradict each other in friendly though peaceful way'. He claimed that his 
'own mind never wavers that I should resign', but that everyone 'publicly 
and...privately urge me to continue'. He even asked Middleton i f there was any 
possibility that the NCL could pass 'a friendly resolution saying the situation is one 
which must be resolved the party cannot go into a general election with a leader who 
disagrees with them on so fundamental a question of policy'.^' His dilemma, however, 
was left unresolved as the party conference approached. 
Manchester Guardian, 14 September 1935, 
''^  NEC minutes, 19 September 1935. 
Dalton diary, 19 September 1935. 
" Lansbury to Middleton, n.d. September 1935, Middleton papers, quoted in Shepherd, 'Labour and the 
Trade Unions', pp. 219-20. Postgate, Lansbury, pp. 300-1, and Schneer, Lansbury, pp. 167-8, offer an 
explanation of Lansbury's behaviour that I do not find convincing. They suggest his reluctance to 
resign may, in part, have been due to his experiences in 1912, which had taught him to 'Never resign'. 
After resigning his seat, in order to contest it as a Suffragette, because he had felt that Labour did not 
support the cause of female suffrage with sufficient vigour, he had quickly found himself in the 
political wilderness. In 1935, however, it is clear that he privately thought that he should resign, but 
was persuaded by others not to do so. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOCIALIST LEAGUE CRITIQUE 
In 1933 Cripps became chairman of the Sociahst League and chief spokesman 
for the Labour Left. He now passionately voiced their demands that the party should 
adopt domestic and foreign policies involving more sweeping changes to the status 
quo than those which the majority of the party, following the moderate NEC-
NJC/NCL line, was currently endorsing. From 1934 he even began to justify the 
demands for more radical policies by making apocalyptic claims that the National 
government was not only capitalist and imperialist, but also leaning towards fascism. 
Thereafter the gulf between the Socialist League and the NEC and NCL majorities 
widened. However, the dispute only came to a head in September 1935 as Cripps, in a 
blaze of publicity, made clear his inability to follow the party line and support a policy 
of League of Nations sanctions against Italy so long as the National government 
remained in power. 
When Cripps had entered politics in 1930 there was no indication that he 
would soon be advocating extreme socialist views. The successful KC whom 
MacDonald made Solicitor-General in October 1930, giving him the customary 
knighthood and arranging for him to become an MP in January 1931, professed only 
to bring a mild Christian and sociahst ethic into political life. He had supported the 
League of Nations, perhaps following the lead of his father. Lord Parmoor.' During 
the Great War Parmoor had been deeply interested in moves to reform international 
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relations, and helped to found the League of Nations Society in 1915. As a result, he 
had also transferred his allegiance from the Conservative to the Labour party, 
eventually becoming Lord President of the Council in the 1924 Labour government, 
with special responsibility for the League of Nations. 
Following the events of 1931, however, Cripps began to move sharply to the 
Left. He decided that the sooner a full socialist programme was aimounced to the 
electorate the better for the fijture of the Labour party. At the party conference in 
October 1931 he exclaimed that 'we can no longer try with one hand to patch up the 
old building of capitalism and with the other to build the new building of socialism'.^ 
In the years immediately following the formation of the National government, 
however, such views were common currency in the party which was concerned with 
preserving its doctrinal integrity, the 'pure milk of the word', as Attlee described it.^ 
In this context Cripps's talk of gradualism being 'gone from the progranmie forever''' 
was hardly unusual. He was simply seen as being more radical in his reaction to the 
perceived capitalist coup of 1931 than many in the party. It was only when Dalton and 
Morrison on the NEC and Bevin and Citrine on the NJC/NCL began to make the party 
more moderate in the course of 1933-4 that the position of Cripps and the Socialist 
League became anomalous.^ 
After Cripps succeeded Frank Wise as chairman of the Socialist League in 
1933 it became more clearly his organisation, not least because he funded a large 
' For Cripps's earlier advocacy of the League see E.Estorick, Stafford Cripps: A Biography (1949), pp. 
66-7, 115; Bryant, Cripps, pp. 73-5. 
^LPACR, 1931,p.205. 
^ Attlee to Tom Attlee, 7 February 1933, quoted in Cowling, The Impact of Hitler, p.27. 
Daily Herald, S February 1932, 
' Cowling, Impact of Hitler, p.28. 
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proportion of its activities out of his own money. ^  From its emergence in October 
1932 the League had taken a more radical approach than the moderate SSIP, from 
which, together with the minority from the ILP that voted against disaffiliation from 
the Labour party, it had been formed. For instance. Wise, the leader of the DLP 
minority group was chosen in preference to Bevin, the chairman of SSIP, to head the 
new body.' Now under Cripps's leadership the Socialist League evolved from a think 
tank and propaganda body for the Labour party, seeking to improve the party's 
policies, into what was effectively an organisation within the Labour movement with 
its own policies and agenda.^  It became, much like the ILP in the 1920s, more 
determinedly the natural home for those who were unhappy with the essentially 
moderate range of policies the party was adopting. Cripps was, however, only moving 
the League in the direction that many of its prominent members - William Mellor, 
Trevelyan, Frank Horrabin, J.T.Murphy, Brailsford, D.N.Pritt, Harold Laski, 
G.R.Mitchison, Ellen Wilkinson and G.R.Strauss - wanted it to go.^  
The Socialist League's approach now became less compromising. At its 
Whitsun conference in 1933 it dramatically argued that the events of 1931 had shown 
how capitalists would employ almost any means to sabotage Labour goveniment and 
socialist legislation. The Socialist League, therefore, advised the Labour party that to 
protect itself against such attacks it should declare in advance an unequivocally 
socialist policy to the electorate. It emphasised that upon winning a general election, 
the party should ensure that the King consent to the abolition of the House of Lords 
before it agreed to take office. The new government should then pass an Emergency 
' Pimlott, Labour and the Left, p.33. 
' Ibid, pp. 44-6. 
'Ibid, p.51. 
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Powers Act giving itself semi-dictatorial powers and proceed to nationalise the Bank 
of England and the joint stock banks. Its rhetoric was now similar to that of the 
CPGB which, acting upon a manifesto from the Communist International, advocated 
support for a United Front against fascism and Nazism and spoke of 'the 
establishment of the working-class dictatorship'." This meant that, although the 
League had also rejected the United Front proposals at the same conference out of a 
sense of loyalty to the Labour party - the NJC had rebuked the CPGB's approach in 
March - the majorities on the NEC and NJC were still greatly perturbed. 
So far as foreign policy was concerned, the Socialist League's position was no 
less radical. Cripps followed those on the far left - John Sfrachey and his allies who 
formed the British Anti-War Movement (BAWM) in late 1932 - in expressing a 
socialist disillusionment with collective security and suggesting that the working 
classes should organise mass resistance to prevent their capitalist elites from engaging 
in war.'^ Accordingly, Cripps argued that the countries in the League, including 
Britain, were 'riveting capitalism upon the neck of a protesting world' and he 
endorsed the idea of a general strike.'^ Trevelyan successfully advanced a resolution 
to this effect on behalf of the Socialist League at the party conference in October 
1933. Nevertheless since the BAWM was simultaneously banned from affiliation with 
the Labour party because of its links with the CPGB, it was clear that the Socialist 
League was treading a fine line. 
' Ibid, p.42. 
'"ibid, p.52. See also S.Cripps, 'Democracy and Dictatorship', Political Quarterly, 4/4 (October-
December 1933), pp. 467-481. 
See, for example, R.P.Dutt, Fascism and Social Revolution (1935), p. xvi, quoted in D.Blaazer, The 
Popular Front and the Progressive Tradition: Socialists, Liberals, and the Quest for Unity, 1884-1939 
(Cambridge, 1992), p. 159, 
Pugh, 'Pacifism and Polities', p.646. 
S.Cripps, 'Your Weapon against War', New Clarion, March 1933, quoted in Bryant, Cripps, p. 118. 
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In early 1934 the attitudes of Cripps and the Socialist League became more 
seriously at odds with the NEC-NJC/NCL line. It had long followed a tradition of 
thought on the Left, running from J.A.Hobson through to Brailsford, in treating 
capitalism and imperialism practically synonymously as a fundamentally inadequate 
system of relations between classes and nations. Now Cripps reasoned that fascism, 
with its militarism, oppression, and insatiable territorial ambitions, was an exfreme 
example of this phenomenon.^ '* He set out to create a stir, and thus strengthen his 
credentials as a spokesman for the Left of the party, by asserting that he foresaw a 
very considerable danger of fascism, not just capitalism or imperialism, in Britain 
itself Along with L a s k i h e had begun to develop these arguments the previous year. 
After a meeting with Cripps, Dalton described with exasperation how he saw 'fascism 
peeping out everywhere in this country'.'^ It was not until 6 January 1934, though, 
that he aired these assertions publicly in his so-called 'Buckingham Palace' speech. 
He began by reiterating the poHcies that the Socialist League had been advocating 
since the time of their Whitsun conference in 1933. The Labour party, he contended, 
had to be 'honest and frank' about its plans on forming a government to introduce 
quickly constitutional and economic reforms that were aimed particularly at 
abolishing the House of Lords and curtailing the influence of the City of London and 
were so drastic that there would be 'no doubt that we shall have to overcome 
opposition from Buckingham Palace and other places as well'. Now, however, Cripps 
went further by arguing that such a course was necessary in order to stave off the 
threat of fascism. He asserted that 'fascism is the last stage of capitalism'; the phase 
Blaazer, Popular Front, p. 157. 
New Clarion, 23 September 1933, quoted ibid, p. 156. 
Dalton diary, 4 May 1933. 
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into which capitalism had been forced by economic pressure to control its industries 
and to suppress all working-class opinions and the political and social struggles of the 
workers. Although Cripps claimed that this was, in a sense, a 'necessary phase in 
almost every country in the world before we can emerge into a socialist or communist 
state', he held 'the grave danger of fascism is that it will precipitate a worid war which 
may well end civilisation and there may be nothing to socialise when the war is over'. 
Incredibly, Cripps even argued that the National government was gradually 
approaching a fascist ideology. Notably, he contended that 'there are a number, 
especially of the younger people, in the National government who would willingly 
have what I can only call a country gentleman type of fascism, that is a benevolent 
suppression of working-class opinion'. 
From this juncture it was but a logical step for Cripps to argue that the League 
of Nations was controlled not just by capitalist but by potentially fascist governments, 
and thus should not be supported. He maintained that he would still rely for national 
security on a plan of pooled security, formed from a nucleus of nations prepared to 
accept 'such a derogation from their national sovereignty as pooled security 
necessarily implies', and move towards an elimination of national armaments, the 
substitution of an international defensive force and the acceptance of arbitration. In 
Cripps's view, however, such a bloc would have to be based firmly on the ideology of 
t 
international socialism, and would, therefore, initially attract the Soviet Union and the 
18 
Scandinavian socialist governments. 
Manchester Guardian, 8 January 1934. 
The Times, 12 January 1934; The Scotsman, 15 January 1934. 
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On 25 January the NEC formally censured and repudiated Cripps's advocacy 
of such drastic domestic reforms.'^ Nevertheless from this point onwards, Cripps 
advanced his argimients with increasing vigour. He added detail to his analysis of 
the burgeoning fascism of the National government. The Socialist League's statement 
of policy Forward to Socialism presented to its conference in June 1934 reiterated the 
argument that 'fascism is growing rapidly in our midst, not in the number of people 
wearing black shirts, but in the minds and actions of the ruling classes and of the 
government itself. It went on to contend that the 'police forces are being rapidly 
militarised and placed in the hands of "property-class-conscious" leaders' and that the 
'air force is being made into a "class-proof military arm', while the 'government is 
openly pursuing the reorganisation of agriculture on a fascist "corporate state" basis, 
guaranteeing interest and profit to the private owners at the expense of the farm 
workers and the consumers'. In response it argued that a detailed 'five year plan of 
socialisation' was needed. After the initial socialisation of the land and the banks -
accompanied by the state control of overseas frade - that of transport, mines, gas, 
electricity and power, iron and steel, munitions and heavy chemicals, cotton and wool, 
shipbuilding and agriculture would follow. The essential corollary - that the 'anchor 
of the foreign policy of a socialist government must be its relationship to the Soviet 
Union' - was also emphasised.^' 
At the party conference in October 1934 the Socialist League was unsuccessful 
when it proposed this programme as an alternative to the National Executive's For 
Socialism and Peace, with its commitment to a much more limited plan of 
' ' N E C minutes, 25 January 1934. 
In his 'Note on Year 1934' Dalton recorded in his diary that Cripps' 'oratorical gaffes have 
continued, at intervals, throughout the year'. 
57 
nationalisation and a foreign policy based firmly on the League of Nations. 
Nevertheless as the international climate worsened during the following year, Cripps's 
criticism of the National government continued unabated. 
In the pamphlet. National Fascism in Britain, published in May 1935, Cripps 
argued that the 'first definite and conscious step towards fascism in Britain' had been 
the Trades Disputes Act of 1927. The election of 1931 was 'essentially fascist in 
nature', indeed 'evidence of the greater efforts of the capitalists to induce the workers 
by fair means or foul to return to power a solid capitalist block'. The forces of 
capitalism had such a triumph at the polls that 'there was no need for any formal, 
personal dictatorship' or for any 'immediate measure to limit the powers of the 
representative assembly', because under the cover of a 'democratic government a slow 
and easily masked beginning could be made towards the corporate state'. Cripps 
claimed that there were now many examples of protective economic nationalism, 
imperialism, industrial organisation on a volimtary basis, and subsidies to capitalists in 
contrast to 'the discipline imposed on the workers by the means test'. He also noted 
ominously that there had been an increase in ministerial legislation and the removal of 
potentially contentious issues, such as unemployment, from the control of parliament. 
Cripps maintained that Britain had not 'emerged as yet into the full flower of fascism, 
or anything like it, nor have we lost our democratic rights, but he firmly conveyed his 
assertion 'that we have moved definitely along the path towards the corporate state, 
not only in actual legislation and methods of government, but above all, in the 
psychology and ideology of our rulers'. He did not suggest that the workers were 
being disciplined 'viciously and ruthlessly as in Germany and Italy', but rather 'gently 
Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1934. 
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and firmly as one would expect fi-om a country-gentleman fascism in Britain' where 
'coloured shirts are not necessary and are embarrassingly obvious'.^^ 
This reading of the domestic political situation meant that Cripps distrusted the 
National govenmient to such an extent that he opposed any moves that might seem to 
support it by calling for League sanctions against Italy to check its impending 
aggression in Abyssinia. At the annual conference of the Socialist League in June 
1935 Cripps had in a lengthy and heated debate defeated the arguments put forward by 
J.T.Murphy, the League's General Secretary, in support of the system of collective 
security. He had thus clarified the Socialist League's policy of opposition to any war 
fought by the National government on the basis that it would be an imperialist one 
ahead of this critical juncture.^^ Now at the meeting of Labour's three Executives on 
3-4 September 1935 he registered his dissent from the majority view favouring the use 
of economic, financial and military sanctions against Italy, though he curiously did not 
attend the second day of discussions when the vote was taken on the draft resolution. '^* 
Afterwards he publicly derided what he considered to be the low motives that moved 
such governments as the National government in Britain. He claimed they followed a 
logic that i f ' i t is considered important enough for this country and France, Italy will 
be stopped, i f necessary by armed force'. However, i f 'as in the case of Japan, it is not 
considered sufficiently important in view of naval risks, Italy will be allowed to go 
on'. There was clearly no sense in 'risking the lives of the workers of this country' for 
such dubious ends. Cripps pointed out that i f the League governments attempted to 
stop Mussolini their actions would be hypocritical. He asked rhetorically, how 'can 
'^'^ Manchester Guardian, 3 May 1935; Daily Telegraph, 2 May 1935. 
Estorick, Cripps, p. 140; Bryant, Cripps, p. 122. 
NEC minutes, 3,4 September 1935; Dalton diary, 3,4 September 1935. 
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those who seized the Transvaal by force of arms deny him [Mussohni] the right to 
seize Ethiopia in the same way and for the same reason'. 
After 11 September, when it became clear that the National government was 
intent on checking Italy through the League, Cripps's criticism of this policy 
intensified. There was now a very real danger that 'we shall be led under the banner of 
the League to another imperialist war'^^ and, since the NEC and NCL majorities were 
appearing to support it, Cripps saw a real opportunity to make political gains for 
himself and the Socialist League. With the party conference less than a month away 
and a general election widely expected before the end of the year Cripps decided to 
resign from the National Executive to which he had been elected the previous year 'in 
order to show people where I s tood ' .He sought to embarrass that body, polarise 
discussion and thereby strengthen his own position at a time when Lansbury's 
resignation appeared likely. 
Cripps and the Socialist League now presented themselves, in contrast to the 
NEC-NCL line, as continuing to hold the defeat of the National government at home 
as their first priority. As Cripps put it, 'however bitter we may feel against fascism, 
however sympathetic we are with Ethiopia' the 'central feature of our action that 
matters most is our determination to dislodge an imperial government in this 
country'.^^ Cripps still claimed that he would 'support armaments and mihtary 
action...if these were being used by a group of socialist states to support an 
international socialist order against capitalist aggression'.However, since the Soviet 
Manchester Guardian, 7 September 1935. 
Cripps to his father, Lord Parmoor, quoted in Estorick, Cripps, p. 141 
Ibid. 
^'^ Manchester Guardian, 16 September 1935. 
Bristol Evening Post, 21 September 1935. 
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government - now a member of the League - was in favour of sanctions, Cripps' 
arguments for a kind of 'socialist' League of Nations lacked much credibility. Indeed, 
Trevelyan - the mover of the Hastings war resistance resolution - now asserted that ' i f 
Russia will act too, I think it our socialist...duty to approve sanctions'.^° Cripps also 
spoke vaguely of 'working-class sanctions' - the refusal to provide goods and services 
from or to buy them from Italy - and how these might check Mussolini's aggression. '^ 
Essentially, however, he did not offer an alternative foreign policy vision to match 
that of the three Executives. Rather in the lead up to the party conference he pitted the 
Socialist League against the majority NEC-NCL line by contending: 
The question is, shall the workers of Great Britain be inveigled 
into the support of an imperialist system by specious excuses 
based on the sham the League of Nations now is, or shall they 
be urged to stand firm and determined against capitalism and 
imperialism in all its forms, utilising the present golden 
opportunity to dislodge their own capitalist government rather 
than offering it their support. 
30 Trevelyan to Cripps, 19 September 1935, C.P.Trevelyan papers, 149. 
^' Bristol Evening Post, 21 September 1925; Manchester Guardian, 23 September 1935. 
Bristol Evening Post, 21 September 1935. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CASE FOR A SANCTIONIST LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
From 1933 Henderson had begun to convert the Labour party to support for a 
sanctionist League of Nations. Initially he merely contended in Labour's Foreign 
Policy that an international League police force should be empowered to use 
economic and military sanctions to restrain an aggressor nation. However, in War and 
Peace, passed by the 1934 party conference, he went fiirther in tentatively asserting 
that the individual member states might have to use their own military forces on behalf 
of the League. Nevertheless, as Henderson's health subsequently failed, it fell to 
others - Dalton, Citrine, Bevin and Attlee - to demand in September 1935 that Britain 
should actually impose military as well as economic sanctions against Italy. 
While most accounts have readily acknowledged that the need for an ultimate 
reliance on force was an undercurrent in Henderson's thought, they have often failed 
to appreciate his importance in shaping Laboiir's foreign policy in the years 1933-4. 
They stress only his presidency of the Disarmament Conference and follow a line 
given by Dalton who wrote that by the end of 1932 with his lengthy absences in 
Geneva he began to lose 'a good deal of his old ascendancy' over the party's National 
Executive.' However, his resignation as party leader in October 1932 following a 
' Dalton diary, 8 October 1932 [B.Pimlott (ed.), ne Political Diary of Hugh Dalton 1918-40, 1945-60 
(1986), p. 168]. M.KH&m\Xon, Arthur Henderson {1921), ch. 16, FLeventhal, Arthur Henderson 
(Manchester, 1989), ch. 6, and Wrigley, Henderson, pp. 180-3, focus on Henderson's activities at the 
Disarmament Conference in the years 1932-4 and give the impression that his influence was otherwise 
limited. Naylor, Labour's International Policy, pp. 73-5, conveys a sense of the importance of War and 
Peace, but does not identify Henderson, or indeed anyone else, as its chief author. H.A.Clegg, A 
History of British Trade Unions since 1889: Volume III 1934-51 (Oxford, 1994), p. 125 rightly 
perceives that the introduction of War and Peace marked a 'fundamental revision of the foreign policy 
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dismal personal reception at the Leicester conference of that year showed only that he 
did not share the majority view, which after the debacle of 1931 thought that a 
considerable rethink and reformulation of domestic, particularly economic, policy was 
needed. His influence over foreign policy nevertheless remained considerable and, as 
party secretary until the end of 1934, he was in a strong position to organise the 
arduous process of clarifying how Labour's League of Nations foreign policy would 
work in a deteriorating international environment. 
Henderson continued to draw much of his inspiration from the ACIQ, as he 
had done since the early 1920s. From November 1932 the Advisory Committee had 
moved in advance of the party and began to argue that the time was apt for a 
reconsideration of Labour's League policy in light of the deteriorating international 
enviroimient.^ As a result of these discussions, the ACIQ had commissioned Woolf to 
draft two memoranda. In the first of these, he comprehensively outlined the need for a 
re-examination of Labour's foreign policy. In the second he argued explicitly that, in 
these circumstances. Labour should assert its commitment to a 'strong' League of 
Nations. At this stage Woolf only specified that this would involve economic 
sanctions,^ but the Committee repeatedly broached the subject of military sanctions at 
its fortnightly meetings.'* 
Henderson's Labour's Foreign Policy followed the same line of reasoning as 
Woolf s memoranda, but offered more detailed proposals for strengthening the 
League. At the outset Henderson explained that the 'extremely grave' international 
of the Labour movement'. He argues, however, that 'the General Council, led by Bevin and Citrine, 
was mainly responsible for it'. 
^ ACIQ minutes, 9 November, 21 December 1932, 15 February, 1 March 1933. 
' ACIQ memoranda Nos. 431 A, March 1933; 433 A, April 1933. It is possible to identify Woolf as the 
author by reference to the ACIQ minutes, 15 March 1933, 3 May 1933, and from D.Wilson, Leonard 
Woolf: A Political Biography (1978), p. 183. 
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situation had necessitated a reappraisal of foreign policy issues. There was an actual 
'state of war in the Far East', 'increasing talk of war in Europe' where Germany was 
particularly 'menacing', and 'the unwillingness of heavily armed states to come to 
come to serious grips with the disarmament problem'. He then contended that since it 
was not the League machinery that had failed but the member governments, a Labour 
govenmient would pass a Peace Act to detail the procedure binding on any British 
government in the settlement of disputes. For the first time he argued that 'a drastic 
reduction of national armaments by international agreement', and ultimately even the 
'total abolition of all national armed forces', would be compatible with 'pooled 
security' through the creation of an 'international pohce force under the League of 
Nations'. Whereas in the past he had projected a public air of ambiguity on the issue, 
he now made it clear that he subscribed to an interpretation of Article X V I of the 
League Covenant which provided for 'joint action - economic, financial, and, i f 
necessary, military - by members of the League against any state which violated its 
obligations and resorted to war'.^ 
Henderson introduced this document as the basis of Labour's League and 
disarmament policy at the 1933 party conference at Hastings.^ Although its central 
provisions were nullified by the passage of Trevelyan's war resistance resolution, 
Henderson was not discouraged. Rather his efforts to commit the party to a sanctionist 
League of Nations policy assimied greater urgency. On 23 January 1934 the NJC 
called for a meeting of Labour's three Executives on 28 February to discuss the 
" See, for instance, ACIQ minutes, 1,15 March, 17, 31 May, 21 June 1933. 
' Henderson, Labour's Foreign Policy, pp. 1, 19-22, 5. 
^LPACR, 1933, pp. 189-91. 
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party's foreign policy.^ The 1933 party conference had resolved that the Labour 
movement should 'frame a comprehensive restatement of Labour's attitude to this 
country's international relations'. When the National Executive met on 27 February 
to discuss its position ahead of the joint meeting, Henderson was adamant that since 
the Hastings resolution 'did not differentiate between wars of aggression and conquest 
and such measures as might be necessary by reason of our obligations to the League 
of Nations', the need for 'a clarification was obvious'. He produced a memorandum 
for this meeting which adumbrated the line eventually taken in War and Peace in 
reconciling war resistance with Labour's broader foreign policy based on support for 
the League of Nations. It stated: 
The collective peace system based on the Covenant and the 
Paris Pact forms a connected whole in which the pledge to 
refrain from war, community judgement on what constitutes 
aggression or resort to war, sanctions, peaceful settlement of 
disputes and disarmament are integral parts. That is why it is 
impossible to separate the problem of war resistance from the 
wider problem of organising peace of which it is one aspect.^  
The meeting of the three Executives on 28 February decided to set up a joint 
sub-committee comprising the chairmen and secretaries of the three bodies to consider 
the question in detail. '° Henderson - a member in his capacity as NEC secretary -
dominated the committee on which Walter Smith (NEC Chairman), Attlee 
(substituting for the i l l Lansbury as PLP chairman), H. Scott Lindsay (PLP Secretary), 
Conley and Citrine (respectively Chairman and Secretary of the TUC General 
Council) also sat. By the time the three Executives met again on 28 June a provisional 
NIC minutes, 23 January 1934. 
^LPACR, 1933, p. 224, 
' NEC minutes, 27 February 1934. 
" ^ C minutes, 28 February 1934; TUC General Council minutes, 28 February 1934. 
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draft of War and Peace had been written which reiterated the interpretation of 
Britain's conmiitment to the League given in Labour's Foreign Policy and reconciled 
this, just as Henderson had earlier indicated, with war resistance. Labour's ultimate 
foreign policy aim was presented as the creation of a 'co-operative world 
commonwealth' with the 'total disarmament of all nations...and the creation of an 
international police force' as considerable milestones towards this goal. However, this 
document now allowed for the possibility that in the period before these measures 
could be effected 'there might be circumstances under which the government of Great 
Britain might have to use its military and naval forces in support of the League in 
restiaining an aggressor nation'. A Peace Act introduced in all League countries 
would devolve three duties upon their peoples and ensure that war resistance would 
only apply to a government that had acted independently of the League . 
Arbitration-Insistence - the duty to insist that our Govenmient 
settle all its disputes by peaceful means and eschew force. 
Sanctions-Assistance - the duty unflinchingly to support our 
Goverrmient in all the risks and consequences of fiilfilling its 
duty to take part in collective action against a peace-breaker. 
War-Resistance - the refusal to accept our Government's 
unsupported claim to be using force in self-defence; insistence 
on submitting their claim to the test of international 
judgement, or of willingness to arbitrate; refiisal to support or 
serve our Government i f it were condemned as an aggressor by 
the League or designated itself as an aggressor by becoming 
involved in war after refusing arbitration. 
At the joint meeting Henderson defended this document as points of issue were 
raised by, amongst others, Dalton, Attlee and Bevin. Although ' in some instances 
amendments were proposed and agreed', it remained essentially the same policy 
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statement that Henderson introduced at the party conference in October." After 
reaching this crucial juncture, however, Henderson's influence on Labour's foreign 
policy began to wane; his already poor health deteriorated further. Now the initiative 
in the formulation of a sanctionist League policy passed to Dalton, Attlee, Bevin and 
Citrine. 
Dalton, with his power base on the NEC, had found himself increasingly allied 
with Citrine and Bevin on the NJC/NCL since 1931. They shared a desire to develop a 
range of clearly defined, though essentially moderate, policies - not merely on foreign 
affairs - for the party to implement once elected. Attlee's involvement with this 
triumvirate was, however, in some ways more surprising. He had been involved with 
the Socialist League in 1932*^ and had worked closely with the leftist Lansbury and 
Cripps in the Commons. It was only after 1933 with perhaps a growing consciousness 
of an impending general election that his stance, mirroring that of the party as a 
whole, became more explicitly moderate.'^ In any case, by October 1934 Dalton, 
Bevin, Citrine and Attlee had themselves come to appreciate the danger of potential 
aggression in Europe and were firmly behind the line taken in War and Peace. 
Dalton had the longest standing interest in foreign affairs, which according to 
his biographer stemmed fi-om his experiences on the French and Italian fronts during 
the Great War. He devoted a great deal of his attention to the subject in the 1920s and 
became Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the 1929-31 
govenmient. Indeed it seems likely that his ultimate political ambition was to become 
" NEC minutes, 28 June 1934, TUC General Council minutes, 28 June 1934; LPACR, 1934, pp. 189-
91. 
Pimlott, Labour and the Left, p. 46. 
" Cowling, Impact of Hitler, pp.27-8, comments on the Labour party's adoption of a more moderate 
stance in 1933-4. 
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foreign secretary.''* Moreover, as with Henderson, whom he greatly admired, Dalton 
had been long inclined towards a strong League of Nations policy. He had become a 
passionate advocate of the League after he visited Geneva in summer 1925.'^ In 
Towards the Peace of Nations, the book he wrote in 1928 to establish his reputation as 
an authority on foreign policy, he described the League's machinery as 'the best the 
world has ever had as an instrument of international co-operation'. He maintained, of 
course, that multilateral disarmament, or 'disarmament all round' was its ultimate aim, 
but denigrated the idea of a moral force League. He asserted that i f a 'high moral tone 
is to be the League's only weapon against the material force of an aggressor, its bluff 
wi l l soon be called'. To him it was clear that to 'think as some sentimentalists appear 
to do, that we can build a new international order without any sanctions whatever, is 
not to think at all'. He went further than many in the party in explicitly acknowledging 
that before this could be realised the League would have to be equipped with the 
economic and military weapons necessary to police the world. In particular he thought 
that national air forces should be replaced by an international air force under the 
contiol of the League Council.'^ 
His first hand experience of Hitler's Nazi regime added a tangible reality to 
this earlier inclination that force might be essential to deter aggressors. During a four-
day visit to Germany in April 1933 Dalton was overwhelmed not only by an 
atmosphere of domestic persecution, but also the potential external danger Germany 
presented. 'Germany is honible' he wrote in his diary 'a European war must be 
"'Pimlott,Z)a/to«, p.182. 
''ibid, p.l85. 
H,Dalton, Towards the Peace of Nations (1928), pp. 114, 211, 290. 
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counted now among the possibilities of the next ten years'.'^ In August 1933 Dalton 
noted the implications of this: ' I f economic sanctions failed, it might be necessary for 
the League to resort to military sanctions as well.' This, however, was the draft of a 
speech that he did not deliver. Instead at the Conference of the Labour and Socialist 
International (LSI) in Paris in late August 1933, Dalton expressed the view that 
'economic and financial sanctions are strong enough' to check an aggressor 
govenmient and that consequently 'military sanctions would not be necessary'. He 
qualified this in a limited way by explaining that the 'need for military sanctions only 
arises out of the possible failure of a united world to apply economic and financial 
sanctions to the fuU'.'^ 
Dalton's reluctance to make his views explicit was due to a pragmatic desire 
not to isolate himself from the mainstream of a party that did not wholly share the 
views of Henderson.At the 1933 party conference Dalton accepted Trevelyan's war 
resistance resolution on behalf of the Executive, perhaps glad to note afterwards that 
'no first-class discords' developed,^' even i f the resolution itself was 'a bit brash'.^ ^ In 
Practical Socialism for Britain, which he wrote in summer 1934,^ ^ Dalton chose to 
remain on safe Labour ground so far as foreign policy was concerned. Within his 
broad advocacy of an international disarmament agreement affording Germany equal 
treatment, an international police force and the international control of civil aviation, 
he stressed that 'collective economic and financial pressure, or even the threat of it, i f 
known to be meant seriously, would, in nearly all hypothetical cases, hah an intruding 
Dalton diary, 27,28,29,30 April 1933; Dalton, Fateful Years, pp.37-41. 
Dalton papers H 6/2. 
•'Ibid. 
Pimlott, Dalton, pp. 226-8. 
Dahon diary, 29 September to 6 October 1933 [Pimlott, Political diary, p. 180]. 
Dahon, Fateful Years, p. 53. 
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aggressor in his tracks'. He argued that these would have detened the Japanese 
aggression.^ '* He did not speak on foreign affairs at the 1934 party conference, but was 
suitably happy that the party 'had moved a long way since the Hastings conference the 
year before'.^^ 
Even i f he had not, as yet, forcefully enunciated his views, Dalton nevertheless 
became steadily more infuriated with those differing from Henderson's line on the 
League. In particular he was concerned with the threat from Cripps, whose leftist 
leanings on all matters, including foreign policy, he felt to be fundamentally at odds 
with his own efforts to give the party a moderate stance likely to appeal to the 
electorate. After a meeting in May 1933 Dalton commented that Cripps had 'no 
judgement at all and oversimplifies everything into capitalists and workers'. He 
thought that he was 'becoming a dangerous political lunatic' and that it 'may become 
a duty to prevent him from holding any influential position in the pa r ty ' .Af t e r 
Cripps was called before the NEC in January 1934 to account for his 'Buckingham 
Palace' speech, Dahon noted in his diary the conviction that Cripps 'is damaging the 
party electorally'. He himself had made 'a violent - perhaps too violent - speech -
asking that this stieam of oratorical ineptitudes should now cease'.^' Later that month 
he noted 'another outtageous speech by Cripps' in which he claimed that in the case 
of a capitalist war under Locarno the Labour party would do its utmost to organise a 
general strike. In exasperation Dalton recorded: 'every word wrong ' .His developing 
feud with Cripps was, of course, as much about politics as it was about policy. He 
'Note on Year 1934', Dalton diary. 
H.Dalton, Practical Socialism in Britain (1935), pp. 368-375. 
Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 53. 
Dalton diary, 4 May 1933. 
" Dalton diary, 19 January 1934 [Pimlott, Political Diary, p. 181]. 
Dalton diary, 22 January 1934 [Pimlott, Political Diary, p. 182]. 
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noted with regret that Lansbury was 'opposed' to the foreign policy of War and Peace 
and 'always shifts back into his old non-resistance attitude', but clearly found 
Lansbury's pacifism less objectionable than Cripps' position. Dalton and Cripps were 
both rising figures in Labour's second generation jostling for control of the party. In 
this struggle Dalton, who was clearly desperate not to be displaced by someone who 
had done nothing for the party before the 1930s, always looked like having the upper 
hand. He had built up a formidable power base on the NEC, which enabled him 
successfully to confront Cripps despite his combined advantage of being one of the 
foremost MPs on the opposition benches as well as chairman of the Socialist League. 
By September 1934 Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC, was also 
outspoken in his support of Henderson's War and Peace policy. He had been 
President of the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) since 1928, but had 
shown little interest in foreign policy before the mid 1930s. Indeed, his initial reaction 
to the rise of Hitler was to fear that a similar dictatorship might emerge in Britain. 
Following the lead given by the NJC's Democracy versus Dictatorship in March 
1933,^ ^ Citrine argued that he was as concerned about a left-wing dictatorship arising 
in reaction to fascism - through the CPGB's demands for a United Front - as he was 
about the development of a fascist dictatorship itself In May 1933 he wrote that 
Hitlerism 'furnishes an object lesson' and that we must not be 'too complacent'. It 
meant that it was now necessary 'to clear our own minds as to whether we really 
believe in democratic institutions'. Clearly with the radical policies of Cripps and the 
Socialist League in mind. Citrine added that there were far 'too many people in the 
^'^ Democracy versus Dictatorship, 24 March 1933. l>i&y\ox. Labour's International Policy, pp. 47-48 
stresses that at this time the trade unionists were concerned with the internal, rather than the external, 
threat from fascism. 
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Labour movement... scornful of parliamentary government' and it was 'about time we 
cleared the decks for the settlement of the issue of democracy or dictatorship'. He also 
acknowledged the 'war spirit' in Germany, but did not dwell on this point.^° Likewise, 
at the Congress of the IFTU on 30 July 1933 he spoke of the 'dangers of fascism, 
which, i f not checked, would bring about war'.^' 
At this stage Cittine's main concerns were with the domestic consequences of 
this international upheaval. For the TUC meeting in September 1933 he produced a 
doctmient on Dictatorships and the Trade Union Movement, which questioned 
whether the 'rise of a dictatorship in Germany may hold certain lessons for us', and 
whether 'there was any great similarity... between the factors which produced a 
dictatorship in Germany and the conditions obtaining in Great Britain'. Only after he 
concluded here that Britain did not share the political, economic and social conditions 
that had inclined Germany towards dictatorship did Cittine become seriously 
concerned with the international threat from fascism. 
Following his involvement between February and June 1934 on the joint sub-
committee that Henderson led in producing War and Peace, Citrine stated 
unequivocally the case for a sanctionist League policy when introducing the resolution 
at the Weymouth TUC in September 1934. He did this by first criticising the opposing 
views. He asserted the fallacy of the belief that it is not possible to 'organise peace 
under competitive capitalism'. The 'whole purpose of the labour movement', he 
contended, 'is based upon the assumption that we can do something in combination to 
W.Citrine, 'Foreword' in J.Compton, Down with Fascism. Citrine had previously recorded his visit to 
Berlin in February 1933 for an Executive meeting of the IFTU when he had been informed explicitly 
that Hitler's eventual plan was to overturn the Versailles Treaty by force if necessary: Citrine papers 
1/14. 
TUCAR, 1933, pp. 436-7. 
" Ibid, pp. 318-325, for Citrine's introduction of the report; pp.425-435, for the document itself 
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restrain other elements now operating under the capitalist system'. He also rebuked 
the commitment to a general strike, doubting the wisdom 'of declaring in advance the 
precise way in which we would meet, in unknown circumstances and in an unknown 
state of public mind and public temper, the menace of war by means of a general 
strike'. Instead he thought it more sensible simply to stand by 'our Standing Order 
which definitely pledges us to a conference in the event of war being imminent', as 
War and Peace suggested. He disparaged the idea that support of the League would 
really mean 'committing us behind the various capital states in the furtherance of 
capitalist wars'. It was clear that ' in a capitalist worid...you are bound to make use of 
those influences inside capitalism which for one reason or another at a particular time 
want to maintain peace'. This was surely what motivated Russia - the 'one state in the 
world which claims to be applying socialist principles' - to apply for membership of 
the League. He was then clear in specifying the overriding need for an ultimate 
reliance on force. Envisaging the scenario of a Japanese attack on Russia he said: 
...Do you think that Japan is going to be restrained by a 
resolution of the League of Nations? Do you think that 
economic sanctions would be sufficient to restrain Japan? 
Why, the mechanism of modem war is such that before your 
economic sanctions could take effect war would be well under 
way. It is no use talking about cutting off commodities and 
financial assistance to a country. I am not going to argue it 
would be of no consequence because it would be in a long-
range policy. But the first acts aggression would be 
committed. The aeroplanes would be passing overhead and 
dropping their bombs on the opponent's territory. Therefore 
you come, by the sheer logic of the case, to the only way in 
which you can resist an aggressor determined to take no notice 
of your resolution and moral influence. You can only restrain 
him by force. 
33 TUCAR, 1934, pp.334-8. 
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An appreciation of the gravity of the international environment clearly 
underiined his position. According to his autobiography he made a lecture tour of the 
United States in September 1934 'specially for the purpose of bringing home to 
American trade imionists that unless the aggressors were induced to abandon their 
designs war on a world-wide scale was certain to break out'. In particular he was 
fearful 'that Germany was rapidly approaching a war footing'.^'* 
Similarly Bevin, the General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers 
Union (TGWU), also placed himself - and the block vote of the largest union - firmly 
behind Henderson's War and Peace policy by the time of the TUC meeting in 
September 1934. He had not given foreign affairs much thought before 1933. After 
the war resistance resolution was passed at Hastings, his impassioned opposition to 
the Socialist League's arrogance in presuming to summon the trade imions to strike 
was far more prominent than any positive conception of how Labour's foreign policy 
might work. In August 1932 following a visit to Prague for the biennial conference of 
the International Transport Worker's Federation he had noted his impression that 'the 
workers of the European countries have little opposition left in them'.^^ Now speaking 
at the Executive Council of the TGWU immediately after the 1933 Labour party 
conference, Bevin explained his view that a general strike could never work in 
practice. Pointedly he asked: 
Who and what is there to strike? Trade unionism has been 
destroyed in Italy and Germany; practically speaking it does 
not exist in France; it is extremely weak in the USA... while 
there is no possibility of a general strike against the Russian 
government in the event of war. What is left? Great Britain, 
Sweden, Deimiark and Holland; virtually these are the only 
Citrine, Men and Work, pp.346-9. 
TGWU General Secretary's Quarterly Report, August 1932, quoted in A.Bullock, Life and Times of 
Ernest Bevin, Volume I (1960), pp. 508-9. 
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countries in which any strong trade union organisations exist. 
Ought we, in the hght of these facts, to go on talking ghbly, 
misleading ourselves as to what we could do with the general 
strike weapon in the event of a world war.^ ^ 
He was, therefore, no doubt pleased when Henderson guided the three 
Executives' joint sub-committee towards a revision of the commitment to a general 
strike. By now, the Austrian social democrats and trade unions, with whom the NJC 
had been in close contact during autumn 1933, had been suppressed in a ruthless and 
bloody manner." He was more than wiUing to deride the idea of a general strike when 
arguing on behalf of War and Peace at the 1934 TUC. He asked how, with 'the whole 
world in a fluid state', could Congress 'determine what another Congress is going to 
do in five years time, or in two years time'? The obligation, xmder the Standing Orders, 
to call a conference in the event of war was clearly sufficient.^ ^ 
Significantly, the looming international danger - he argued that dictatorships 
'have never succeeded economically' and that his 'great fear of Mussolini, and of 
Hitler and German militarism, is that...they will turn to war as an outlet for their 
economic difficulty at home' - meant that he now endorsed the overt 'pledge...to 
collective security' contained in War and Peace^^ The following month at the party 
conference in Southport Bevin made his support for Henderson's sanctionist League 
policy explicit. He argued that: 
To support the League... and not back it with power in certain 
eventualities, seems to me to be like a man entering a union on 
condition that under no circumstances will you ever ask him to 
TGWU General Secretary's Quarterly Report, November 1933, quoted ibid, p. 550. 
Ibid, pp. 546-50. My interpretation here differs from that oflfered by Bullock. Whereas I emphasise the 
importance of Henderson in the formulation of War and Peace, Bullock contends that so far as the 
commitment to a general strike was concerned, it was 'the trade union leaders who killed 
this...suggestion once and for all'. 
^^TUCAR, 1934, pp. 331-2. 
Ibid, p. 332. 
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strike, and that in the event of the Executive having to take a 
decision, the individual could come to his own conclusion.'^ '' 
Even more so than Citrine and Bevin, Attlee only slowly perceived the need to 
reconsider the party's foreign policy as a result of the deteriorating international 
environment and the rise of Hitler.'*' His membership of the joint sub-committee that 
drafted War and Peace imder Henderson's guidance was clearly an educative 
experience. When Attlee came to speak on behalf of the resolution at the 1934 party 
conference he explained how in 'the light of fresh experience' he renounced his earlier 
support of unilateral disarmament. He was aware of the potential threat of war. He 
remarked that it was easier 'to believe in imilateral disarmament when you live in 
England than it is for people living on the continent'. Attlee stressed Labour's long-
term aspiration to create a 'world state' or Commonwealth and to internationalise 
aviation so as to 'supersede all other armed forces'. It was in this context that he 
supported 'collective security' or 'sanctions in the hands of the League'.'*^ In a 
pamphlet entitled An International Police Force Attlee wrote in a similar way of a 
'world authority' that 'must be prepared in the last resort to enforce its decisions by 
sanctions' and even made it clear that he supported the full range of sanctions 
provided for under Article XVI of the League Covenant. He argued that 'whatever 
may be the force of public opinion' and 'the possibilities of financial and trade 
embargoes, there must be an eventual possibility of armed intervention against an 
aggressor'. He stressed that this armed force should be concentrated in a supranational 
'^LPCAR, 1934, pp. 170-1. 
K.Harris, Attlee (1982), p. 115, acknowledges that 'Attlee reacted more slowly than some of his 
colleagues...to the need to reconsider the party's foreign policy in the light of the rise of Hitler'. 
T.Burridge, Clement Attlee: A Political Biography (1985), p. 99, overlooks this point and rather 
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became apparent. 
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authority, to the exclusion of the national armies, navies and air forces, but did not shy 
away from the question of its use against a recalcitrant state. He was particularly keen 
to see the creation of an international air force and presented detailed proposals about 
the way in which it should be 'organised, constituted and controlled'."^ 
During the first half of 1935 these advocates of a sanctionist League of 
Nations policy - Dalton, Citrine, Bevin and Attlee - were preoccupied with the threat 
posed by Hitler. They largely ignored the brewing Italian-Abyssinian discord despite 
being informed about the seriousness of the situation by the ACIQ. After a series of 
discussions the committee had called upon Noel-Baker to draft a memorandum.'*'* 
Ominously, this warned that there has 'never been any dispute between two powers in 
which the fundamental principles of the Covenant were so clearly at stake'.'*^  
Significantly, however, as Dalton, Citrine and Bevin perceived the gravity of 
the German threat they also realised that support for a sanctionist League necessitated 
support for British rearmament. In March-April 1935 Dalton spent three weeks in 
Czechoslovakia - 'the model democracy of central Europe' - and claimed that he 
'came back... with a heightened sense of the war danger' because 'Benes and other 
Czech leaders had no doubt of Hitler's designs'.'*^  Reflecting the views he expressed 
at the time, Dalton recalled in his memoirs that from the time that Hitler's claim to 
have reached air parity with Britain was made public on 3 April 1935 'I was sure that, 
though we must also negotiate, we must also immediately rearm'. On this matter he 
*^LPACR, 1934, pp. 174-5. 
C.R.AttIee, An International Police Force (1934). 
^ACIQ minutes, 13, 27 February, 13, 27 March, 10 April 1935. 
ACIQ memorandum. No. 455A April 1935. It is possible to identify Noel Baker as the author by 
Teftrence to ACIQ minutes, 13 February 1935. 
Dalton, Fatejul Years, p.61. 
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now began to work 'steadily both with Bevin and Citrine'.'^' They understood, as 
Citrine put it in his autobiography, that because the 'League had no forces of its 
own... it was patent...that it must rely on those of its member states who were ready 
and capable of shouldering the major responsibility of defending the collective 
security we talked so much about'. 
War and Peace had primarily conceived sanctionist action being carried out 
through some kind of League of Nations police force, and had only very cautiously 
broached the possibility of Britain actually using its own armed forces on behalf of the 
League to check aggression. Although the creation of an international force was, in 
many respects, impracticable, it was theoretically consistent with the achievement of 
national disarmament - Labour's overriding foreign policy objective. The PLP had 
accordingly been able to criticise the first measure of the National government's re-
armament programme, which had been introduced on 30 July 1934. On this occasion 
Attlee had condemned the government's policy in traditional Labour terms as: 
a policy of rearmament neither necessitated by any new 
commitment nor calculated to add to the security of the nation, 
but certain to jeopardise the prospects of international 
disarmament and to encourage a revival of a dangerous and 
wasteful competition in preparation for war.'^ ^ 
Now, however, Dalton, Citrine and Bevin realised that support for a sanctionist 
League in the dire international environment necessarily required increased national 
armaments. Dalton became 'very impatient with the opposite view still held by many 
of my colleagues'. He understood that the PLP voted against the arms estimates in 
order to register disapproval of the government's foreign policy rather than to object 
^'lbid,p.65. 
Citrine, Men and Work, p.350. 
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to the arms themselves. He recognised, moreover, that ceasing this practice would 
mean drawing closer to the National government after the half-way point in 
parliament had been reached, but thought the circumstances justified it. He held that it 
was 'piffle', not to mention 'damned bad polities', to argue 'in the sorry pass to which 
we had now come, because we had a damned bad British government therefore the 
British nation should not be better armed - the arms, one hoped, would outlast the 
govemment'.^° 
At a meeting of the three Executives on 21 and 22 May Dalton, supported by 
Citrine and Bevin, argued that the PLP should abstain rather than vote against the 
arms estimates. He contended that it was difficult to vote against an increase in the 
RAF sufficient to give the country at least parity with Germany. He spoke 'vigorously 
against Hitler' and thought the issue was: are you 'in favour of Hitler having four or 
five aeroplanes to our one?' After the meeting decided to continue to vote against the 
arms estimates - apparently because of a conciliatory speech by Hitler - Dalton 
concluded that the 'way Hitler is not distrusted is disturbing'. It was, by now, 
abundantly clear that Henderson was marginal; the initiative in the formulation of a 
sanctionist League policy had passed to the younger generation. Henderson could not 
accept that rearmament was an essential corollary of support for a sanctionist League. 
Dalton recorded that he was 'stuck in his eternal rut after Disarmament Conference, 
and dislikes my attitude'. '^ Perhaps of greater concern to Dalton, Bevin and Citrine, 
however, was that Attlee - the other prominent advocate of a sanctionist League -
refused to support British rearmament. As a front bench spokesman he may have been 
H.C.Deb, 292, col. 2366, 30 July 1934. 
Dalton, Fateful Years, p.63. 
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more worried about how this shift could be justified in parliament. He may also have 
believed that supporting rearmament would have fractured PLP unity. In any case, at 
the meeting of the three Executives Attlee made it clear, as he went on to argue in the 
Commons the following day, that he opposed the arms estimates. He argued that it 
was not clear whether they had been calculated for a system where 'we are to stand by 
ourselves or in a system of collective security'.^ ^ 
Over the next few months the supporters of a sanctionist League began to 
perceive the importance of the steadily mounting tension between Italy and Abyssinia. 
From the time when Attlee provoked the first substantial discussion of the matter in 
the Commons on 7 June 1935 the approach that he, along with Dalton, Bevin and 
Citrine, would take as hopes of reaching a peaceful settlement faded, became clear. In 
the first place he stressed that the British government should warn Mussolini that any 
attempted aggression on his part would be met by strong restraining action through the 
League. Under Article X of the Covenant, its members were pledged to 'preserve as 
against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political integrity of all 
members of the League'. A 'clear statement' should, therefore, be drafted to tell 
Mussolini 'that this government, like other governments, uphold the Covenant against 
an aggressor state'. Attlee argued there was a need to emphasise that because 'the 
refusal to accept the League's authority constitutes a refusal by an aggressor...we 
shall in that event be bound under Article XVI of the Covenant ...to act'. Attlee also 
maintained that the Italian-Abyssinian tension was important beyond its immediate 
context. It was 'a test of the reality of the League and the sanctity of the Covenant of 
Dalton diary, 21-2 May 1935; Dalton, Fateful Years, pp.63-4. The NEC minutes, 21, 22 May 1935, 
do not detail the debates and give the impression that the meeting was in 'substantial agreement'. 
" Harris, ^ ff/ee, p. 127; J.H.Brookshire, Clement Attlee (Manchester, 1995), p. 157. 
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the League', and provided 'a great opportunity...for re-establishing the authority of 
the League and the rule of law in Europe'.^ "* 
The ACIQ continued to play an important role in shaping policy. Indeed, it 
seems that it was only through the intervention of Noel-Baker that Dalton perceived 
the significance of the Italian-Abyssinian dispute. Noel-Baker recorded that as late as 
June Dalton was 'inclined to say that Hitler was so great a danger that we must not 
quarrel with Mussolini or drive M.[ussolini] into alliance with H.[itler]'. Noel-Baker 
was, however, close to Dalton, having worked with him at the Foreign Office between 
1929 and 1931, when Noel-Baker had been Henderson's Parliamentary Private 
Secretary. Possibly using as evidence the results of the Peace Ballot, which had yet to 
be announced but of which Noel-Baker was aware through his involvement with the 
LNU, he managed to persuade Dalton that this would 'not be the attitude of the 
party'.^ ^ 
At the end of June the publication of results of the Peace Ballot duly provided 
a context in which economic, and even military, sanctions against an aggressor nation 
seemed likely to be acceptable to much of the electorate. Now the ACIQ stepped up 
its efforts to convince the Labour party to demand such measures against Italy. In July 
one of their memoranda, again written by Noel-Baker, suggested that the party should 
push for the introduction of economic and financial sanctions and even broached the 
idea of an extensive naval blockade. The memorandum argued that if the Royal Navy 
were to block the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar, Italy would not be able to 
" Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 64; EC Deb, 302, cols. 375, 377, 22 May 1935. 
^'^HCDeb, 302, col. 2194, 7 June 1935. 
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send supplies to Eritea or the Somaliland.^ ^ Shortly afterwards, on 24 July, the trade 
imion dominated NCL called on the British government to declare that so far as the 
Italian-Abyssinian dispute was concerned it would 'discharge its duties and 
obligations as a member of the League without fear or favour'.^' A fuller statement of 
the sanctionist League of Nations policy was then given in the resolution drafted by 
the party's three Executives on 3-4 September 1935. This matched its condemnation 
of Italy's violation of the 'law of nations' with a commitment to apply sanctions if 
they were needed. It was clear that they were ready to condone the use of military 
sanctions. The resolution insisted emphatically that the League should 'use all the 
necessary measures provided by the Covenant' to prevent an attack on Abyssinia. 
Though the text of the resolution did not elaborate on the point, those who drafted it 
were fully aware that through firm collective action against Italy they were hoping to 
do more than just check Mussolini's designs on North Africa. They sought, above all, 
to re-establish a sense of international law and order that would subsequently deter the 
far more menacing prospect of Nazi aggression. Their pohcy tried to deal with the 
threat to world peace as a whole and was, therefore, essentially the antithesis of that 
which the National government had appeared to be following at the Stresa Conference 
in March 1935. At this meeting Britain and France had tried, and at the time 
seemingly succeeded, in persuading Mussolini to co-operate with attempts to restrain 
Hitler. 
With a firm policy now urged against Italy, Dalton sttongly repented of his 
earlier fascination with Mussolini. Ever since he had served on the Italian Front during 
ACIQ memorandum, No 457A, July 1935, The identification of Noel-Baker as the author is from 
ACIQ minutes, 26 June 1935. 
LPACR, 1935, p.7. See also NCL minutes, 23 July 1935 for the decision to produce such a statement. 
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the war Dalton had held a sentimental attachment to the country. He had also met 
Mussolini in December 1932 and been not only impressed with his bold economic 
policies, but also somewhat overawed by the Duce himself^' He remained, of course, 
fully conscious of the primacy of the German threat. In his memoirs he recorded his 
belief that 'Italian fascism, just because it was Italian, was much less intense, more 
casual, and therefore less evil, than German Nazism.' He realised that 'Italy, standing 
alone' could never 'be the grim threat that Germany soon would be'.^° 
When Citrine introduced the three Executives' resolution to the TUC meeting 
at Margate between 2-6 September he too followed this reasoning. He contended that 
action had to be taken against Italy. Mussolini had 'already put himself outside every 
moral principle...abrogated every feeling and sentiment of decency in his own 
country', and prevented 'his citizens exercising any restraint on his unbridled will'.^' 
Citrine argued, therefore, that the 'only way of dealing with a bully... is by the use of 
force.. .the collective force of the nations who are determined to preserve the peace of 
the world'. Moral resolutions were 'no good', indeed they were 'wasted on 
Mussolini'. Military sanctions were 'a very important point in our policy'. The nations 
in the League would have to 'put at the disposal of the League of Nations such a 
measure of force of a military, naval and aerial character as may be necessary to make 
the sanctions effective' - the very policy that had been endorsed by a clear majority of 
the 12 million respondents to the Peace Ballot.Citrine took pains, however, to 
present the demand for strong collective action against Italy as a way of preventing a 
TUC General Council minutes, 3,4 September 1935; Dalton, Fateful Years p. 66. 
Dalton diary, 30 December 1932 [Pimlott, Political Diary, pp. 172-3]; Dalton, Fateful Years, pp. 33-
5; Pimlott, Dalton, pp. 214-5. 
*° Dalton, Fateful Years, p.41. 
TUCAR, 1935, p. 368. 
" Ibid, pp.348-9. 
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world-wide spiral of aggression. He described vividly how fascism was on 'the 
warpath'.Now even the possibility of war with Italy was preferable to letting 
Mussolini's aggression proceed unchecked: 
I overheard a delegate say at the commencement of my speech 
"It means war". It may mean war, but that is the thing we have 
to face. We have to face the fact that there is no real alternative 
now left to us but the applying of sanctions involving in all 
possibility, war. But I say this. If we fail now, if we go back 
now, war is absolutely certain. I ask you what will happen to 
Germany if Italy can break through her tieaties, if Italy can 
treat with contempt the nations of the world who have plighted 
their word to preserve peace? Do you think we are going to 
restiain a Hitier Germany from carrying out its projected plan 
of attack upon Soviet Russia?...If we fail now... international 
anarchy will reign supreme.^ '* 
The majority NEC-NCL vision of how the League would work to stabilise the 
international order went further than trying to provide an object lesson to Hitier. In 
sharp contrast to the pacifists and the Socialist League, they placed a great deal of 
faith in the League. They wanted to see it vindicate itself in the Italian-Abyssinian 
dispute so it would have the credibility to extend its jurisdiction and investigate the 
underlying causes of wars, which it assumed were connected to economic inequality. 
Since Hitier, no less than Mussolini, had expressed an interest in acquiring colonial 
territories, it was assumed in order to have access to raw materials and additional 
markets, the relevance of this facet of their policy was obvious. Bevin in particular 
stands out as someone who fully appreciated its importance. It was due to his 
influence that the resolution drafted just prior to the Margate TUC concluded with two 
paragraphs explaining the economic causes of wars and striving for a solution. 
" Ibid, p. 348. 
Ibid, pp.349-50 
65 Bullock, p. 563. 
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Moreover, when he spoke at Margate Bevin elaborated on the demand for 
'the League of Nations to summon a World Economic Conference and to place on its 
agenda the international control of the sources and supply of raw materials'. The 
underlying causes of war were clear to Bevin. Sanctions would only be effective if 
they prohibited access to the 25 or so basic materials which supplied all the metals and 
power for both industry and war. He reasoned that if 'these materials were 
internationally controlled' and available 'by purchase and not by conquest, 90 per cent 
of the world causes of war would be entirely removed'. Economic nationalism, which 
Mussolini was practising in trying to seize territory in order to exploit its resources, 
had to be outiawed. Unless this was done 'immediately you settle the Abyssinian 
question and stop Mussolini, then tomorrow you have a quarrel with another nation 
over raw materials or over another sphere of influence'. Britain, he contended, even 
ought to offer a lead and develop the Empire imder the auspices of the League into a 
'stage of world organisation'.^ ^ 
Throughout the summer the advocates of a sanctionist League had been 
securing support for their stance. In particular the block votes of the tiade unions had 
been placed firmly behind the sanctionist line ahead of the debate at the annual 
conference. This process had begun at the Biennial Conference of the largest union -
the TGWU - in the summer. Here Bevin had defended Labour's League of Nations 
foreign policy, though not yet, of course, one that specifically demanded economic 
and military sanctions against Italy in the face of a number of leftist attacks. He had 
won conference approbation for his approach through what his biographer has termed 
'a common sense argument' for the League. Bevin had explained how he himself had 
TUCAR, 1935, pp. 354-7. 
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hesitated for a long time before signing War and Peace. He had only been convinced 
to sign by the realisation that the League, with all its imperfections, was the only 
alternative to a return to the old diplomacy. He had then made clear his support for the 
use of force to uphold the Covenant by repeating his analogy with 'a man entering a 
union'. 
This process of securing trade union backing for sanctionist action against 
Italy had been completed during the debate on the matter at the TUC meeting on 5 
September. Here Bevin and Citrine faced opposition to the three Executives' 
resolution foreshadowing that which would follow at the Labour party conference. In 
all, seven delegates spoke against the resolution and this prolonged the debate beyond 
its allotted time. Although one of the delegates, Arthur of the Mineworkers, held 
pacifist objections to sanctions, most of those opposing the resolution voiced the 
leftist objections to trusting the 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' National government with 
the power to operate sanctions. This was, for instance, the tack taken by Scollan of the 
Distributive and Allied Workers, who repeatedly heckled Citrine as he replied to the 
arguments levelled against a sanctionist line.^ ^ However, by the time these objections 
had been dismissed and the resolution overwhelmingly endorsed, the Trade Union 
block votes were positioned firmly behind the policy of sanctions against Italy. 
Now throughout September the advocates of a sanctionist League prepared for 
a fight at the party conference as their opponents - the pacifists and the left -
expressed their dissent to the three Executives' resolution. Despite having secured 
TUC support for a policy of sanctions, Citiine cleariy felt that the issues at stake were 
so manifestiy crucial that he was willing to consult the National government privately 
67 TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference, 1935, pp. 248-55, quoted in Bullock, Bevin, pp. 558-9. 
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about them. He revealed in his autobiography that he was receptive to overtures from 
Baldwin, on 13 September 1935, to consult the TUC about rearmament, and he was 
disappointed when nothing came of these plans.^ ^ Now Dalton began openly to attack 
Cripps. While he claimed to respect the personal views of Lansbury and Ponsonby 
which 'have been well known and consistently held for many years', he did not tieat 
Cripps - whom he perceived as his most threatening rival - so leniently. He accused 
Cripps of inconsistency, saying that he had only indicated his objection to party policy 
at the beginning of September. He lambasted Cripps's view that 'this country should 
stand impotently aside in this crisis [and] violate its tieaty obligations under the 
Covenant of the League' because it would signal 'all clear' to Mussolini and was 'in 
effect... pro-fascist and pro-war'even though the views propounded by the pacifists 
were surely equally objectionable. 
Morrison and Greenwood now joined the ranks of those advocating the use of 
sanctions. They both held prominent positions in the party, not least through their 
status as ex-ministers, but had shown little interest in foreign policy over the last few 
years. Greenwood had been engrossed in efforts, through the Policy Research 
Committee, to reformulate economic policy.'^ Morrison had devoted a tiemendous 
amount of time and energy to the London County Coimcil (LCC), especially after he 
became its leader when Labour won contiol of the Council in March 1934.^ ^ Now, 
TUCAR, 1935, pp. 352-69. 
Citrine, Men and Work, pp. 353-4. Citrine left for Russia the following day, leaving the matter in the 
hands of Bevin, who apparently did not feel inclined to pursue it. 
™ The Times, 23 September 1935. 
'^ Pimlott, Labour and the Left, p. 36. 
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however, they began to speak on behalf of the sanctionist line and added to the sense 
of impending intra-party struggle in the weeks before the party conference.^ ^ 
" See, for example, Manchester Guardian, 16 September 1935, for one of Greenwood's statements 
advocating sanctions against Italy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PARTY CONFERENCE 
By the time the Labour party conference met at the Dome in Brighton on 30 
September, the two million block votes held by the ttade unions, particularly Bevin's 
TGWU, had of course ensured the overall result of the debate on 'Italy and 
Abyssinia'. However, what could not have been anticipated, even in a context where 
news of Italy's attack on Abyssinia was expected at any time (and indeed came on 2 
October), was the dramatic fashion in which the objections of the Socialist League, 
and especially those of the pacifist Lansbury, would be decisively checked. 
Dalton intioduced the three Executives' resolution on the morning of 1 
October and explained the reasoning behind the statement. In an attempt to temper 
opposition to a controversial policy, he presented it as the logical culmination of the 
War and Peace resolution that had been endorsed at conference the previous year. He 
made it clear that 'strong collective action', involved the League in the possible use of 
military force alongside economic and financial sanctions, arguing that if 'Mussolini 
be so limatic as to resist the united League of Nations, then so be it'. He argued that 
concerted action against Italy would work to re-establish a sense of international order 
in these dangerous times. While the imposition of sanctions against Italy might 
involve the possibility of war, by contrast 'the scrapping of sanctions as a reserve 
force behind international law means war, and war soon, and war in a far more terrible 
form than even a war between Italy and Abyssinia'. Dalton also touched on the 
dilemma of how this policy could be distinguished from that of the National 
government which had made a 'death-bed repentance' to the principles of the League 
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'largely because of the Peace Ballot' - which, he claimed, had shown that support for 
the Labour movement was 'great and growing'. Unable to make any criticism of the 
government's current public position, he had to argue that through its earher inaction 
over the Sino-Japanese dispute it had led Mussolini to believe that he could proceed 
by force of arms thinking that 'what was right for Japan could not be wrong for him'. 
Dalton also set the caustic tone of the debate by pre-empting the arguments of 
both Cripps and Lansbury, and charging them both with inconsistency. He noted that 
in the House of Commons on 1 August Lansbury had asked the government without 
reservation 'to stand loyally by the League Covenant and all that it implies'. Similarly 
he recalled how Cripps, speaking retrospectively about the Sino-Japanese dispute on 
I I March 1935, had claimed that a Labour government would have co-operated with 
other nations under the auspices of the League of Nations to check aggression, 
initially by economic pressure and 'by armaments if necessary'.' 
Cripps followed Dalton and launched directiy into a criticism of the resolution. 
He repeated his argument that with the 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' National 
government in power the 'cential factor in our decision must turn, not so much upon 
what we as a country should, or should not do, but upon who is in confrol of our 
actions'. While he detested Mussolini, he contended that he could not ignore the 
'sordid history of capitalist deception', in particular the 'empty and hollow excuses of 
1914'. He implied that the NEC-NCL line was contradictory by asking how they 
thought the Conservative party, 'whose criminal record has been so admirably painted 
by Hugh Dalton', could be trusted with 'the lives of the British workers'. Dismissing 
Dalton's 'theory of death-bed repentance' he contended that the 'capitalist leopard 
^LPACR, 1935, p. 153-6. 
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cannot change its spots... even i f he does colour wash them to conceal them from the 
workers'. Undoubtedly directing his remarks at Dalton and his allies, he added that it 
was 'not our job to help in that concealment; it is our job to expose it ' . He conceded 
that his views had changed. It had now become clear that the League was nothing 'but 
the tool of the satiated imperialist powers', really an 'International Burglars Union' 
mth which, Cripps prophetically warned, Mussolini was likely to 'drive a satisfactory 
bargain... even though they have momentarily turned policemen'. Despite his passing 
reference to 'working-class sanctions', Cripps contended that it was 'imfortunate, 
tragic, but inescapably true, that the British workers cannot at this moment be 
effective in the international political field'. Instead he asked the movement to devote 
its whole energies 'to the defeat of... capitalism and imperialism... in this country'.^ 
Next Ponsonby stated the pacifist case and endorsed unilateral disarmament. 
He also asserted that collective security through the League would necessarily be 
ineffective. With self-interested nations you 'cannot get unanimity', he argued, and so 
sanctions would merely 'aggravate the situation'.^ William Mellor, of the Socialist 
League, then spoke in support of Cripps's arguments. He asked conference to 
remember that 'the positive action of fighting your enemy at home is greater in value 
than the negative disaster of defending your home enemy abroad'.'* 
Attlee followed these speakers and set out to undermine their arguments on 
behalf of the three Executives. He dismissed pacifist 'non-resistance' as a 'personal 
attitude', saying it was not a 'possible policy for people with responsibility'. And he 
attempted to demonstrate the absurdity of the Socialist League's objection to sanctions 
^ Ibid, pp. 156-8. 
^ Ibid, pp. 160-1. 
^Ibid, p. 172. 
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so long as a 'capitalist' and 'imperialist' government was in power, by arguing that i f 
a Socialist government were in power 'the capitalist and imperialist can say just the 
same thing'. The most revealing part of his speech, however, was when he clarified 
what the Labour party meant, in practice, when it spoke of 'military' sanctions. The 
advocates of sanctions did not want the League forces 'to make war on Mussolini and 
stop him'. But they were prepared for the scenario that 'economic sanctions may 
possibly provoke an attack from Mussolini'.^ Thus far the debate followed an 
imspectacular course. It was only with Lansbury's speech that events began to take a 
turn for the dramatic. 
When Lansbury rose to speak he had been given a 'tumultuous reception' as 
the whole conference sang 'For He's a Jolly Good Fellow'.^ A great sentimental 
attachment to Lansbury pervaded the Labour movement; the veteran politician was 
well respected for his efforts to restore party morale after 1931 and with his 
commitment to minority causes - feminism as well as pacifism - was also seen as the 
conscience of the movement. Lansbury proceeded to outline the dilemma he faced as a 
Christian pacifist and leader of the Labour party - a 'Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde position'. 
He had, at times, expressed the views of the party but at others his personal belief that 
'force never will bring permanent peace'. Now, however, he was convinced that the 
movement was 'making a terrible mistake' and spoke of his alternative plans for 
unilateral disarmament and for economic and Christian appeasement that would 
involve Britain putting its Empire at 'the service of mankind'. He did not gloss over 
the implications of his pacifist viewpoint, arguing that so far as military sanctions 
were concerned he could 'not see the difference between mass murder organised by 
Ibid, pp. 173-4. 
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the League, or mass murder organised between individual nations'. He ended his 
speech in powerful, suitably Christian, terms: 
I f mine were the only voice in this conference, I would say in 
the name of the faith I hold, the belief I have that God intended 
us to live peaceably and quietly with one another, i f some 
people do not allow us to do so, I am ready to stand as the 
early Christians did, and say, "This is our faith, this is where 
we stand, and, i f necessary, this is where we will die". 
Lansbury had stressed at the outset that he would 'not consider an expression 
of opinion hostile to my continuance as leader as anything more than natural and 
perfectly friendly'. He recognised that the conference was constitutionally unable to 
deal with the question of parliamentary leadership, and so had called a meeting of the 
Parliamentary Executive for the following week.' Even so as Lansbury sat down 
Bevin walked to the platform in a mood of barely concealed anger. 
Bevin had spent a lifetime in the trade union movement, faithfully observing 
its ethic of loyalty to committee decisions, and now launched straight into an attack on 
Lansbury's conflict of loyalties between party and conscience. He asserted that it was 
now 'rather late' for him to make his objections known and in a now infamous 
reproach claimed that it was 'placing the Executive and the Movement in an 
absolutely wrong position to be taking your conscience round from body to body 
asking to be told what you ought to do with it'.^ At this point there was an outcry from 
many parts of the hall,^ but Bevin did not back down and went on to present a case for 
Lansbury's disloyalty. He claimed that Lansbury had never made any objection to 
^ Postgate, Lansbury, pp. 301-2. 
^LPACR, 1935, pp. 175-7 
^ Some accounts claim that Bevin used the phrase 'hawking your conscience'. See, for instance, Daiton, 
Fatejul Years, p. 69; Citrine, Men and Work, p. 352. 
' Bullock, Bevin, p. 568. 
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War and Peace as it was being drafted and finally accepted, nor had he even voiced 
his dissent at the meeting of the three Executives at Margate. In this respect Bevin also 
criticised Cripps, who had not made his case clear at Southport or at the critical 
meeting at Margate. He again made his attack decidedly personal, revealing a dislike 
of 'intellectuals' that had no doubt been reinforced when he was passed over in favour 
of Wise to become chairman of the Socialist League in 1932. Pointedly he argued 
that: 
People have been on this platform talking about the 
destruction of capitalism. The middle classes are not doing too 
badly as a whole under capitalism and fascism. The thing that 
is being wiped out is the Trade Union movement. 
Bevin concluded his speech by comparing the actions of Lansbury and Cripps 
with those of MacDonald in 1931 whose 'great crime... was that he never called in his 
party'. Indeed, he was as emphatic now as he had been in the aftermath of August 
1931 that the trade union view should ultimately prevail in the party. His view (which 
he shared with Citrine) that the party was merely the political wing of the trade union 
movement could not have been clearer. He asserted that 'our predecessors formed this 
party. It was not Keir Hardie who formed it, it grew out of the bowels of the Trades 
Union Congress'.'° 
As soon as Bevin had finished Lansbury tried to respond, only to find that the 
microphones had already been switched of f Among the members of the NEC who 
had refused to accept his resignation only Morrison gave Lansbury any support. 
^°LPACR, 1935, pp. 177-80. L.Minkin, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party 
(Edinburgh, 1991), p. 31, considers this a classic confrontation between the leaders of the trade unions 
and the parliamentary party. 
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saying to him 'Stand by your beliefs, George' as he left the platform." Morrison's 
biographers do not account for this particular incident, but they do stress that with his 
attention largely directed elsewhere, his understanding of foreign policy was 
decidedly 'superficial'. Perhaps this was why he evidently did not feel so strongly 
about Lansbury's actions as some of his colleagues. 
In any case, the debate continued the following day with Morrison winding up 
on behalf of the National Executive. He made a rather conciliatory speech, in which 
he called for tolerance towards those 'who have doubts' about the application of 
financial, economic and military sanctions, revealing that he himself had been a 
conscientious objector during the Great War.'^ However, after Bevin's bellicose 
speech the debate had, in effect, been concluded. Dalton described how Bevin had 
'hammered him (Lansbury) to death'.''* M.A.(Molly) Hamilton, one of the delegates 
present, later recalled that Bevin had 'compelled a naturally sentimental body to see 
an issue in larger than personal terms'. His attack on Lansbury had conveyed a sense 
of the 'responsibility of the issue itself and this had 'carried the conference'.'^ To be 
sure, the passage of the three Executives' resolution by 2,168,000 to 177,000 was a 
conclusive endorsement of a sanctionist League policy.'^ A considerably smaller 
number of dissenting votes had been cast than in the previous year when 673,000 had 
opposed War and Peace. On 4 October the NCL made a statement to the conference 
asking for the immediate recall of Parliament 'in order that the government should 
inform the House of Commons what steps they have taken, and propose to take 
" Postgate, Lansbury, p. 304. 
Donoughue & Jones, Morrison, p. 249. Morrison, Autobiography, does not give any explanation of 
his actions. 
^^LPACR, 1935, pp. 190-3. 
Dalton, Fateful Years p.69. 
Quoted in Bullock, Bevin, p. 569. 
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through the League in order to bring hostilities to an end'." Lansbury's resignation as 
party leader the following week was a foregone conclusion, as most of the press made 
clear.Just as in 1914 the party leader, at odds with the majority of the NEC and the 
TUC General Council, had been effectively deposed. 
^^LPACR, 1935, p. 193. 
'"'ibid, 1935, p. 242. 
See, for instance. News Chronicle, 2, 3 October 1935. 
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CONCLUSION 
The outcome of the party conference debate on Italy and Abyssinia marked the 
critical juncture in the development of the Labour movement's foreign policy in the 
1930s. Thereafl:er armed collective security superseded disarmament as Labour's 
overriding foreign policy objective. It had accepted the view taken by the majorities 
on the NEC and NCL that it might prove necessary to resist the dictators with military 
force. The pacifist and leftist objections to this course had been conclusively 
defeated. Initially the impression of disunity following the party conference inhibited 
the party's performance at the general election that had been shrewdly called by 
Baldwin to exploit the situation. Moreover, it was not until July 1937 that Labour 
technically confirmed its support for armed collective security when the PLP ceased to 
oppose the National government's rearmament programme. Nevertheless, 'Cato's' 
assertion about the importance of the debate concluded at the Dome in Brighton holds. 
In the dramatic atmosphere of summer 1940 its co-authors simplified the story 
considerably, but unlike later interpretations were correct in asserting that Labour's 
decisive turning point had occurted in 1935, not 1937, 1938 or 1940. This was when 
the party had embarked on the road that led to its gradual coalescence with the 
Conservative anti-appeasers from late 1938 and culminated in its acceptance of office 
in Churchill's May 1940 coalition, fully rejuvenated after its political marginalisation 
between 1931-5. 
The overwhelming endorsement of a sanctionist League policy at the party 
conference in 1935 signified that the forces of both pacifism and leftist dissent had 
been decisively suppressed. The defeat of these two factions was a considerable 
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achievement for Dalton, Bevin, Citrine and Attlee, who went on to dominate the party 
for a generation - which is why October 1935 can rightly be seen as a watershed. The 
pacifist strain ran deep in the pacifistic Labour party. As the events of 1933-5 
demonstrated, individuals, even leaders, holding pacifist views were not merely 
tolerated but respected. It was no coincidence that Ponsonby, despite his impassioned 
advocacy of humanitarian pacifism, did not feel inclined to resign before September 
1935. Nor was it surprising that none of the executive bodies - the NEC, NCL or PLP 
- asked Lansbury to stand down before the party conference. The majority in the party 
did not share the pacifist conviction that any use of force violated the dignity of 
human life. They did, however, hold beliefs that inclined them to sympathise with the 
pacifists within their ranks. The coalition of interests within the Labour movement 
was held together by its common commitment to domestic social reform, and this was 
generally thought to require a peacefiil international environment. At its simplest it 
inspired the belief that expenditure on arms was inimical to the achievement of any 
substantial social improvement at home. Moreover, since the Great War a deep 
suspicion of the morality of private arms manufacture had permeated the whole party. 
They held that the practice inclined the powerfiil capitalist munitions firms - 'the 
merchants of death' - to stimulate arms races in order the increase their own profits. 
Indeed, Attlee had moved a PLP resolution demanding the abolition of private arms 
manufacture in November 1934.' Nevertheless, pacifism was destroyed as an effective 
force within the Labour party in 1935. Under the pressure of a now rapidly 
deteriorating international envirormient, the wider pacifist movement, particulariy 
Sheppard's Peace Pledge Union (PPU), in which Lansbury became prominent. 
' HCDeb, 293, cols. 1293-1304, 8 November 1934. 
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continued to campaign for unilateral disarmament. However, in contrast to the years 
before 1935 pacifist views, and those holding them, were now discredited within the 
Labour party. 
The censuring of the Socialist League at the 1935 party conference was 
equally significant. The League's leaders, especially Cripps but also Mellor, echoed 
sentiments that struck a chord with a substantial section of the party. Most of the party 
would have nothing of their rhetoric about an impending fascist take-over in Britain. 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of 1931 a deep distrust of capitalist parties did pervade 
the Labour ranks, and it was this that Cripps had tried to mobihse in campaigning 
against allowing the National government to operate sanctions. 
Nevertheless, in the short term the Labour party's decisive shift towards 
support for a sanctionist League policy hindered the party's performance in the 1935 
general election. The passionate debate at the party conference that culminated in 
Bevin's savage denunciation of Lansbury had created the impression that the party 
was 'hopelessly divided'.Following Lansbury's resignation as party leader on 8 
October and his replacement by Attlee, Baldwin moved to exploit the situation. On 19 
October he called the general election for three weeks time.^ On the central issue of 
the day - foreign policy - Labour now struggled to distinguish their stance from that 
of the National government. Both espoused support for the use of sanctions through 
the League of Nation to check Mussolini's aggression. On 7 and 11 October the 
Council of the League of Nations and then its Assembly had declared Italy an 
aggressor in violation of the Covenant. As Mowat perceptively noted, Baldwin 'had 
stolen their [the Labour party's] clothes, and they could only protest that he would 
The Times, 3 October 1935. 
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never wear them'.'' The National govenmient's manifesto declared that the 'League of 
Nations will remain as heretofore the keystone of British foreign policy', and pledged 
that so far as the Italian-Abyssinian dispute was concerned 'there will be no wavering 
in the policy we have hitherto pursued'.^ In turn, the Labour party's manifesto could 
only condemn the National government's 'attempt to exploit for partisan ends a 
situation of grave international anxiety', yet reaffirm that it too stood 'firmly for the 
collective peace system'. Throughout the election campaign, the Labour party was 
forced to adopt a defensive posture and to respond to the National government, rather 
than elaborating on their own policies.^ The National government, on the other hand, 
with the dashing Anthony Eden as Minister for League of Nations Affairs, was able to 
emphasise Labour's disarray. Many of its candidates followed the line of its 
manifesto, which had stated that the Labour party was 'hopelessly divided on the most 
important points in foreign policy'.^ Greenwood, for one, tried to turn this argument 
against the National government and its supporters, by stressing the differences in 
emphasis between the speeches of Baldwin and Churchill on the issues of rearmament 
and the League of Nations. His arguments, however, lacked the same pungency. In 
fact, the Conservative party had resolved its own greatest cause of internal discord 
with passage of the Government of India Act. The Labour party's electoral prospects 
had also been directly undermined by the loss of Lansbury as party leader. It was 
understood that Attlee - Labour's fourth leader since 1931 - was only holding the 
position on a temporary basis, pending the expected return to parliament of senior 
^ T.Stannage, Baldwin Thwarts the Opposition (1980), pp. 125-7. 
Mowat, Britain between the Wars, pp. 553-4. 
' Stannage, Baldwin, p. 155. 
* Ibid pp. 138, 142. 
^Quoted ibid, pp. 139, 157. 
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party figures at the next election. He was also a little known figure outside 
Westminster, who in sharp contrast with Baldwin, was unlikely to hold much personal 
appeal to the wider electorate. 
In the event. Labour won 154 seats in the November general election, leaving 
the National government with 429 seats, of which 387 were Conservatives. Although 
the party had almost tripled the 59 seats it held prior to the dissolution of parliament, 
the result overall was disappointing. On 28 October Dalton - who along with 
Morrison was one of those who was returned to the Commons - had considered that 
Labour could realistically expect to win as many as 240 seats. ^  
It was only after the general election, as the National government's 
commitment to upholding League sanctions against Italy appeared to waver, that the 
tremendous implications of Labour's shift to support for armed security began to 
become apparent. Following the election, the party chose Attlee as its permanent 
leader after a three-way contest vwth Morrison and Greenwood. Labour now criticised 
the National government for accepting, without protest, the work of the Committee of 
18 set up to co-ordinate the imposition of sanctions as it decided on measures which 
fell short of the complete and general boycott stipulated by Article XVI. It had 
introduced an arms embargo, a comprehensive financial sanction, but only a limited 
embargo on certain important commodities - crucially excluding oil. In the House of 
Commons on 5 December, for instance, Dalton attacked the National government for 
'not doing its full duty in this matter'. The embargo did not include oil, which Dalton 
• Dalton diary, 28 October 1935 [Pimlott, Political Diary, p. 191]. 
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argued was the 'most indispensable of all the modem materials of war', whose 
restriction would enable the League to 'stop Mussolini's war'.^ 
After the revelation of the Hoare-Laval pact on 10 December, Labour's 
criticism of the government's flight from the League intensified. The foreign secretary 
had agreed a plan with his French counterpart that asked Abyssinia to concede 
approximately half its territory to Italy. Amid public uproar Baldwin repudiated the 
pact on 19 December and Hoare was forced to resign, being replaced by Anthony 
Eden.'° Attacking the government for attempting to desttoy 'the whole foundation of 
collective security'," Labour now became the clear pro-League party. In the first six 
months of 1936, with the Italian forces looking increasingly like being victorious, it 
continued to push for the imposition of stronger sanctions, particularly on oil. Indeed, 
the party continued to make these demands even after the Italian forces had entered 
Addis Ababa and Haile Selassie had fled his country in eariy May.'^ Labour was 
similarly critical of the government's decision to abandon sanctions, announced 
peremptorily by Neville Chamberlain who described them as 'the very midsummer of 
madness' and then formally by Eden in the House of Commons on 18 June. '^  
As a result of the party's determined stance in favour of armed collective 
security. Labour was begiiming to align with Churchill - the great villain of the 
General Strike. It now became clear that in October 1935 Labour had made the 
decisive shift which, when prompted by international events in 1938 - the Austrian 
^HCDeb, 307, cols. 324-7, 5 December 1935. 
HCDeb, 307, cols, 2030-1, 2035, 19December 1935. 
" HCDeb, 307, col. 2018, 19 December 1935. 
For Dalton making such demands see HCDeb, 311, cols. 1722-8, 6 May 1936. For similar comments 
by Attlee and Morrison %QQ Daily Herald, 11 May 1936 Forward, 16 May 1936. 
' Chamberlain made this statement at the 1900 Club on 10 June, cited in Cowling, Impact of Hitler, p. 
140. For Eden's announcement of the withdrawal of sanctions, see HCDeb, 313, col. 1201, 18 June 
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Anschluss and the Czech crisis - would lead to the tentative beginnings of the cross-
party alliance that was completed in 1940. Following Churchill's outspoken support 
for collective security following the revelation of the Hoare-Laval pact and after 
Hitler, in flagrant violation of both Versailles and Locarno, occupied the demilitarised 
zone in the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, Attlee welcomed him to the pro-League 
ranks as 'a repentant sinner'.''* Later in the year major figures from the TUC, notably 
Citrine, joined Churchill's campaign for 'Arms and the Covenant', which combined 
explicit support for the League with demands for large-scale disarmament. However, 
the campaign fell apart in December shortly after Churchill and Citrine had shared a 
platform at the Albert Hall - though not because of differences over foreign policy -
but because Churchill's interest was deflected to the Abdication, and the idea of 
forming a King's party. 
At this stage, however. Labour still had to clarify its support for armed 
collective security by giving approval to the National government's rearmament 
programme. For the time being, Eden could justifiably accuse Labour of professing 'to 
support the League with horse, foot and artillery', but of only supporting it in reality 
'with threats, insults and perorations'.'^ Likewise, Chamberlain could dismiss 
Labour's policy as 'defiance without defence'. Throughout 1936 Dalton, Citrine and 
Bevin continued their struggle to convince the PLP to support rearmament. 
Nevertheless, the endemic suspicion of the National government, which had been 
greatly bolstered by the revelation of the Hoare-Laval pact, prevented the majority of 
1936. For criticism by Greenwood see HCDeb, 313, col. 1219, 18 June 1936, and for that by Dalton 
see HC Deb, 313, cols. 1714-5, 23 June 1936. 
^^H.C.Deb, 310, col. 1531, 26 March 1936. 
J.F.Naylor, Labour's International Policy, pp. 171-2. 
HCDeb, 311,col. 1736, 6 May 1936, 
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the party from accepting their arguments. In early March a series of meetings of 
Labour's three Executives were convened to discuss the position that the PLP should 
take towards the National government's proposals for a £330 million rearmament plan 
that had been aimounced in the White Paper of 2 March. Dalton, Bevin and Citrine 
spoke passionately on behalf of Labour support for rearmament. However, the 
contrary view, voiced by the powerfiil grouping of Attlee, Morrison and Greenwood, 
prevailed. Dalton was exasperated. He thought the party was 'more agin' our own 
Government than agin' Hitler'.'^ In the House of Commons on 9 March Attlee duly 
opposed the National govenmient's plans. He repeated the arguments he had used 
since 1934 and stressed that Labour would approve of the maintenance of such 
defence forces as were 'necessary and consistent' with membership of the League, but 
did not believe that this was a consideration that the National government took into 
account. As Morrison put it, the gist of the Labour party's policy was to 'condemn 
the whole foreign policy, practically speaking, of this government since it came into 
office'.'^ Dalton's view, however, was that this approach to defence policy 'failed to 
face realities'.^° In the absence of a genuinely international League police force, a 
commitment to a sanctionist League necessarily entailed support for national 
rearmament. From a post-war perspective, Attlee himself castigated the PLP's practice 
as 'unwise and pedantic'.^' 
In July Dalton was again unsuccessful in an attempt to persuade the PLP to 
abstain rather than vote against the National govenmient's service estimates. On 27 
'"^  NEC minutes, 2,3,4 March 1936; TUC General Council minutes, 2,3,4 March 1936; Dalton diary, 
2,3,4 March 1936. 
HCDeb, 309, col. 1851, 9 March 1936. 
" Ibid, cols. 2073, 79. 
°^ Dalton diary, 2,3,4 March 1936. 
C.R. Attlee, As it Happened (1954), p. 98. 
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July when the vote was taken, Dalton, and a few others, notably the Co-operative 
leader, A.V.Alexander, invoked the conscience clause, usually monopolised by the 
pacifists, and abstained from the vote in order to register their dissent from the party 
line. The PLP stressed that their vote against an Estimate was not a vote for the 
abolition of the service, but rather a vote in opposition to the policy of which the 
Estimate was an expression. Nevertheless, the widely respected view of Grey that 
'Great armaments lead to war' still found a receptive audience in the Labour party, 
and this underlay some of their reticence to accept rearmament organised on a 
distinctly national basis. As late as 1937 Attlee did not 'believe that the entry into a 
competition in arms will give security', but that, in contrast, ' i t is heading straight to 
the disaster of another world war'.^^ 
Moreover, a document produced by the NCL for the party conference in 
October 1936 failed to clarify Labour's logically incompatible foreign and defence 
policies. This reaffirmed that Labour's policy was to maintain such defence forces as 
were consistent with Britain's responsibility as a member of the League. It also 
stressed, however, that because of the National govenmient's record, the Labour party 
could not 'accept responsibility for a purely competitive armament policy'. I f the 
document's meaning was not clear enough, Attlee emphasised in the course of the 
debate that there 'is no suggestion here that we should support the govenmient's 
rearmament programme'.^^ 
It was only on 22 July 1937, that Dalton managed to persuade the PLP, by 45 
votes to 29, to abstain rather than vote against the govenmient's service estimates. The 
outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, with its confrontation between 
CKAttlee, The Labour Party in Perspective (1937), pp. 270-1. 
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Franco's fascists and the Republican forces, played a large part in bringing about this 
change of stance. The Republican cause greatly stirred the party's emotions - as was 
apparent from the proceedings at the 1936 party conference in Edinburgh.^'' The 
Labour party had initially endorsed the National government's policy of Non 
Intervention. However, on 28 October 1936, it formally began to demand arms for the 
Republicans. Dalton recorded how this decision helped him to secure PLP support for 
rearmament. He described that after demanding 'Arms for Spain', it became 'more 
and more impossible...to justify a vote which, whatever pundits in parliamentary 
procedure might pretend, means to the plain man, "No Arms for B r i t a i n ' " . T h e 
change in PLP policy was important. It meant that Labour's defence policy was now 
consistent with its foreign policy. However, neither this decision, nor its formalisation 
in a policy document. International Policy and Defence, passed by the party 
corrference on October 1937, constituted a fundamental change in party policy and a 
break with the past in the way that the party's emphatic embrace of armed collective 
security in 1935 had done. 
Similarly, the overwhelming defeat of Cripps's demands for a Unity 
Campaign at the 1937 party conference merely completed the process of discrediting 
the Labour Left that had begun in earnest in October 1935. Since 1933 the CPGB and 
the ELP had been in favour of a United Front of all socialists to combat fascism and 
depose the National government. However, it was not until January 1937, when the 
impending world-wide struggle between socialism and fascism had been dramatised 
by the war in Spain, that the Socialist League decided to defy party policy and initiate 
^^LPACR, 1936, p. 206. 
Naylor, Labour's International Policy, pp. 162-69, describes the emotional fervour that the Spanish 
Republican cause unleashed in many of the delegates at the 1936 party conference. 
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the Unity Campaign with the aim of convincing the Labour party to endorse just such 
a Front. By the end of March the NEC had ruled that any member of the Sociahst 
League was inehgible for party membership from 1 June. The League dissolved itself 
in May, but Cripps continued to press the idea of a United Front. He spoke on its 
behalf at the party conference in October, but with the overwhelming vote in favour of 
the Executive's position, he abandoned the idea altogether shortly afterwards. Cripps's 
leftist threat to the moderate NEC-NCL line was at an end. To be sure, in January 
1939 he began his 'Petition Campaign' for the creation of a Popular Front - an 
alliance of dissident Conservatives, Labour and Liberals - with electoral pacts at 
constituency level. However, the idea of a Popular Front was not exclusively, or even 
largely, an initiative from the Left. The NEC decided to expel Cripps in March - a 
decision that was endorsed at the Party conference in May. However, his expulsion 
was due to his persistent pursuit of his independent moves and disloyalty to the party 
line. He was by this stage actually moving in much the same direction as the rest of 
the party. 
With its endorsement of armed collective security. Labour found itself, in the 
course of 1938, increasingly aligned with the dissident Tories - not just Churchill and 
Amery, but also Eden who resigned as foreign secretary in February 1938. Hitler's 
aspirations to extend the territorial boundaries of his Reich had become vividly clear, 
and Chamberlain, who had succeeded Baldwin as prime minister in June 1937, 
seemed willing to acquiesce in the hope of satisfying Hitler's appetite. The Labour 
party and the Conservative anti-appeasers both now argued that some sort of 
Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 133. 
Pimlott, Labour and the Left, chs. 9, 10, 18, discusses Cripps's involvement with the plans for United 
and Popular Fronts. 
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'collective' check should be imposed on Hitler. Whereas Chamberlain was decidedly 
passive during February and March over Hitler's plans to form an Anschluss with 
Austria, explicitly forbidden in the Versailles Treaty, Attlee demanded that the League 
act to restrain Hitler and Churchill advocated a Franco-British-Russian alliance.'^ ^ 
Since these were the only great powers remaining in the largely discredited League, it 
was only the gloss on their policies that differed. 
The Labour party and the Conservative anti-appeasers also took the same 
critical stance over Chamberlain's attempts to appease Hitler's demands for 
repatriation of the Sudeten Germans in a series of meetings at Berchtsgaden, 
Godesberg and finally Munich during September. The Labour party had demanded in 
early September that 'the British government must leave no doubt in the mind of the 
German government that it will unite with the French and Soviet governments to resist 
any attack upon Czechoslovakia'. After Chamberlain agreed to Hitler's demands, 
with only the proviso that the German occupation take place in phases, Attlee asserted 
that Britain had suffered 'one of the gravest diplomatic defeats' in its history, in 
allowing Hitler to seize a 'tremendous victory'.^^ The party was as critical as 
Churchill, who famously derided Chamberlain's diplomacy: 
One pound was demanded at the pistol's point. When it was 
given, two pounds were demanded at the pistol's point. Finally 
the Dictator consented to take £1 175 6d. and the rest in 
promises of good will for the future.^° 
HCDeb, 333, cols. 54-5, 14 March 1938. 
LPACR, 1939, pp. 13-14. This demand was made in Labour and the International Situation - a 
declaration drafted by the three Executives before the TUC meeting in early September 1938. 
H.C.Deb, 339, col. 52, 3 October 1938. 
Quoted in Naylor, Labour's International Policy, p. 253. 
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By this stage Labour was firmly pursuing the course that culminated in its 
refusal to join a coalition under Chamberlain in September 1939, followed by its 
agreement to join one under Churchill. Indeed, there had been a substantial movement 
for the creation of a cross-party coalition in October 1938. The Conservative, Harold 
Macmillan, approached Dalton on 3 October and arranged for him to meet with 
Churchill and Eden later that day.^' Attlee and Morrison expressed some sympathy to 
the idea, and Cripps was outright enthusiastic. Dalton later recalled that 'for a fleeting 
moment, it seemed possible that a large-scale Tory revolt against Chamberlain might 
change the whole political scene ' . In the event, the idea of a cross-party alliance 
floundered largely due the reluctance of Eden, whose liberal image would have 
formed an essential link between the die-hard Tories and the Labour party. 
Nevertheless, the important point is that none of these moves would have been 
possible i f the party had not undergone a fimdamental reconsideration of its foreign 
policy between 1933 and 1935, culminating in the debate at the 1935 party 
conference. The implications of this shift for subsequent British politics and policy are 
tremendous. Followed to its logical conclusion, i f Labour had not decisively endorsed 
armed collective security in 1935 it might not have been strongly represented in 
Churchill's coalition, with Attlee as the wartime deputy prime minister. Labour might 
not then have won the 1945 general election, and the political landscape of post-war 
Britain might have assimied a very different character. 
'^ Dalton, Fateful Years, p. 199. 
Ibid, p. 209. 
See Pimlott, Labour and the Left, ch, 17. 
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